Comparative Overview of Nanoenterprises, Microenterprises, and Gig Economy Jobs: Characteristics, Market Factors, Risk Resilience, and Potential Impact


Introduction

Across the economic landscape of the developing world, one cannot overlook the proliferation of small scale enterprises that create a significant economic impact at the grassroots level. This intricate tapestry of economic activity, composed of nanoenterprises, microenterprises, and gig economy jobs, holds tremendous potential for poverty alleviation and socio-economic mobility. To unlock this potential, it is imperative to delve deeper into their unique characteristics, operational factors, resilience to risk, and potential for growth and impact.

Nanoenterprises, the smallest economic units, often operate on the margins of the formal economy, usually out of necessity rather than opportunity. They serve local communities, providing essential goods and services, often with limited resources and technological access. On the other end of the spectrum, microenterprises tend to be more established entities that, despite their small size, exhibit opportunity-driven entrepreneurship and contribute significantly to local and national economies.

Occupying an increasingly significant role in the 21st-century economy, gig jobs – driven by the burgeoning digital platform economy – provide flexible employment opportunities for millions. Like nanoenterprises, they primarily cater to the individuals’ survival and livelihood, but they leverage the power of technology to a much greater extent.

This paper provides a comparative overview of these three crucial components of the economic fabric. It unpacks their defining features, elaborates on their market and operational factors, gauges their risk resilience, and appraises their potential impact. By doing so, the study seeks to reveal opportunities for targeted policy interventions and entrepreneurial support programs to bolster these enterprises’ potential to contribute to sustainable development goals and socio-economic betterment.

In the global south, the sheer scale of nanoenterprises underscores their pivotal role in poverty reduction and economic development. As of 2022, an estimated 8.1 million nanoenterprises operate in the Philippines, and Nigeria boasts a staggering 32.8 million of such businesses (Olagboye, 2021). This highlights a potent yet often overlooked economic force in these developing nations.

Despite the mammoth scale of nanoenterprises, their nuanced understanding remains a challenge due to the prevalent practice of grouping them under the microenterprise umbrella. This conflation, common in many developing nations, masks the unique challenges and potential of nanoenterprises, potentially hindering effective policy and intervention design. Distinguishing nanoenterprises from their larger counterparts, microenterprises, and understanding their intersections with gig jobs offers an opportunity for a more targeted, effective approach to sustainable economic development.

In this light, focusing on the growth and resilience of nanoenterprises, coupled with a nuanced understanding of microenterprises and gig economy jobs, can unlock an inclusive economic paradigm. This approach acknowledges and leverages the power of the smallest economic actors to address poverty, arguably one of the most formidable challenges of our times.

This grand scale and potential of nanoenterprises is not unique to the Philippines or Nigeria but resonates across the developing world. Recognizing and understanding this magnitude can spur a more global momentum towards harnessing these enterprises’ potential and integrating them more effectively into sustainable economic development strategies.

This paper serves as a stepping-stone to understanding these enterprises’ multi-layered complexities in the context of the developing world. It sets the stage for an inclusive discourse that acknowledges the unique role and challenges of each sector and propels evidence-based decision-making towards a more inclusive and resilient economy.

  • Nanoenterprise definition

Chapter 2 delves into the unique landscape of nanoenterprises, dissecting their characteristics and operational dynamics across four crucial categories.

The first category, ‘Enterprise Characteristics’, encapsulates the foundational attributes that define a nanoenterprise. This includes asset size, enterprise registration, the poverty level of owners, motivation for entrepreneurship, education levels and record-keeping habits, and number of employees. These characteristics set the stage for understanding the breadth and depth of nanoenterprises, their constraints, and their operational capabilities.

The second category, ‘Market and Operational Factors’, explores the interaction of nanoenterprises with the market and the operational choices they make. These factors shape the nanoenterprise’s economic footprint and influence their growth trajectory. The access to finance, market participation, use of technology and information, ownership of equipment, capacity for value addition, and the structural dynamics of nanoenterprises fall under this category.

Next, ‘Risk and Resilience Factors’ delve into how nanoenterprises respond to challenges, market shifts, and disasters. Their resilience and flexibility can be pivotal in determining the survival and potential growth of nanoenterprises, especially in volatile economic climates common in the developing world.

Lastly, the ‘Potential and Impact’ category examines the broader socio-economic contribution of nanoenterprises and their growth potential. This section illustrates the role nanoenterprises play in their communities and the larger economy and identifies opportunities for enhancing their economic impact.

Also within Chapter 2, we embark on a crucial comparative analysis. Nanoenterprises, while often subsumed under the broader umbrella of microenterprises, present distinctive characteristics, challenges, and opportunities. The delineation between these two segments of enterprises is imperative to discern for tailoring more effective support interventions and policies.

The comparison also extends to gig economy jobs, an emergent form of livelihood that has grown exponentially in the recent decade. The gig economy, while seemingly disparate from nanoenterprises, offers interesting parallels and contrasts particularly in their resilience to market shifts, flexibility, and the nature of the jobs itself.

This three-way comparison serves not just to highlight the unique attributes of nanoenterprises, but also to illustrate the nuances and fluidity of the entrepreneurship landscape in the contemporary economic milieu. The analysis paves the way for a more refined perspective, challenging traditional classifications and urging for a more dynamic understanding of these small-scale economic activities.

Throughout this chapter, we aim to shed light on the interactions and differentiations between nanoenterprises, microenterprises, and gig economy jobs. Ultimately, our goal is to present a comprehensive picture of their respective roles and potential in fostering inclusive economic growth and poverty alleviation in developing countries.

  1. Enterprise Characteristics
 NanoenterprisesMicroenterprisesGig Economy Jobs
Asset SizePhP3,000 to PhP150,000>PhP150,000 to PhP3MVaries
Enterprise RegistrationMostly UnregisteredMostly RegisteredTypically Unregistered
Poverty Level of OwnersMostly PoorMostly Non-PoorPoor and Non-Poor
Motivation for EntrepreneurshipSurvival and livelihoodOpportunity-seeking and growthSurvival and livelihood
Educational Level/Record KeepingLower educational levels and minimal record keeping.Higher educational levels and better record keeping.Varies. Some may maintain good records, especially digital gig workers
Number of Employees01 to 91 (Self)

In the Philippines, asset size of nanoenterprises generally ranges from PhP3,000 to PhP150,000. This amount is close to nanoenterprises located in developing economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This relatively low capital base forms the backbone of a mostly unregistered economic segment largely populated by poor owners.

Driven by survival and livelihood needs, these nanoentrepreneurs typically possess lower educational levels and maintain minimal record keeping – a reflection of their constraints and the informality of their businesses. Furthermore, nanoenterprises usually have no employees, with the owner doing all the operational tasks. Unpaid family members usually help in their livelihood.

In contrast, microenterprises operate on a larger scale, with asset sizes ranging from more than PhP150,000 to PhP3 million. A majority of these businesses are registered, signaling a greater engagement with formal financial and regulatory systems. Microenterprise owners typically fall within the non-poor category and are driven by opportunity-seeking and growth motives rather than mere survival. Reflecting a step up from nanoenterprises, microenterprises are characterized by higher educational levels and better record keeping. Moreover, they provide employment opportunities, supporting between 1 to 9 employees.

Meanwhile, gig economy jobs represent a distinct segment, operating on varied asset sizes and typically functioning as unregistered entities. The poverty level of gig workers spans both poor and non-poor categories, suggesting a wide socioeconomic spectrum within this group. Motivated by survival and livelihood needs, gig workers’ educational level and record-keeping practices vary considerably, largely influenced by the nature of their jobs which are primarily digital or app-based. As the term implies, gig economy jobs predominantly engage the individual worker – the ‘self’ in self-employment, with each gig worker essentially constituting their own ‘enterprise’.

  • Market and operational factors
 NanoenterprisesMicroenterprisesGig Economy Jobs
ExamplesSari-sari stores, Carinderia, Ambulant vendors, Smallholder farmers and fisherfolksSmall retail stores, manufacturing businesses, service providers.Delivery Riders, Ride Share Drivers, graphic artists, video editors, content creators, writers
Access to FinanceRely heavily on loans, mostly from informal sources, making them vulnerable to predatory lending.Have more access to formal financial services but still face financial constraints.Usually rely on personal finance and may use digital platforms for fundraising
Market ParticipationLimited due to barriers like high cost of raw materials, lack of market information, and outdated technology.Have better market access but still face challenges such as lack of resources and information.Varies, could be local or global based on gig platform
Access to Technology and InformationVery Limited (due to unaffordable gadgets and low internet availability and high cost of internet access)Moderate (may have more access to technology, but still limited due to financial constraints)High (largely reliant on technology platforms for their services)
Ownership of EquipmentUse rudimentary and obsolete equipment or lease more advanced equipment.Typically possess better equipment and have ownership.Owned
Value AdditionVery limited due to high resource constraints.Can add value through improvements, innovationsDepends on the job, but often limited by platform constraints
StructureAtomistic, low capacity for coordinationSmall Organizational Structure , can coordinate internally and externallyUsually individualistic, coordination varies

Nanoenterprises in the Philippine context take on various forms such as sari-sari stores, carinderias, ambulant vendors, and smallholder farmers and fisherfolks, among others. These enterprises heavily rely on loans, predominantly sourced informally, which makes them susceptible to predatory lending. Their participation in the market is relatively limited due to barriers such as high raw material costs, lack of market information, and use of outdated technology. Access to technology and information is generally very limited, primarily due to the unaffordability of gadgets, and the limited availability and high cost of internet access. As for equipment, nanoenterprises often use rudimentary and obsolete tools, or they lease more advanced equipment when resources permit. The potential for value addition in these businesses is extremely limited, due to their resource constraints. The structure of nanoenterprises is atomistic, with low capacity for coordination due to limited resources and high cognitive load on the entrepreneurs.

On the other hand, microenterprises – such as small retail stores, manufacturing businesses, and service providers – have relatively better access to finance, often availing of formal financial services, albeit still facing financial constraints. Their participation in the market is significantly improved compared to nanoenterprises, though they still encounter challenges such as lack of resources and information. Access to technology and information is moderate, with financial constraints acting as a limiting factor. Microenterprises typically possess better, owned equipment, which facilitates value addition through improvements and innovations. Their organizational structure allows for internal and external coordination, reflecting a degree of organizational maturity.

Gig economy jobs represent a new facet of employment and entrepreneurship. These include delivery riders, ride share drivers, and online freelancers such as graphic artists, video editors, content creators, and writers. Unlike the other two categories, gig workers often rely on personal finance and digital platforms for fundraising. The nature of their market participation varies significantly and can span local to global markets, depending on the gig platform they engage with. Access to technology and information is generally high, as their jobs are largely reliant on technology platforms. In terms of equipment, gig workers typically own their own eqipment, but the potential for value addition is often limited by platform constraints. Gig jobs usually involve individualistic structures with varying degrees of coordination.

  • Risk and resilience factors
 NanoenterprisesMicroenterprisesGig Economy Jobs
Disaster ResiliencyVery LowLowLow
FlexibilityHigh. Can shut down, re-open or pivot easily as opportunities ariseMedium. May require substantial effort for pivotingHigh. Can shift roles/platforms quickly
Agility to Market ShiftsVery LowLowModerate to High, depending on the gig

A critical factor in assessing the potential and vulnerability of nanoenterprises, microenterprises, and gig economy jobs is their level of disaster resilience. In this respect, nanoenterprises exhibit a very low level of disaster resiliency, making them highly vulnerable to various shocks and stressors. Microenterprises and gig economy jobs have slightly higher disaster resiliency, but they still remain at the low end of the spectrum, underscoring the precariousness of their operations in the face of disruptive events.

Another vital aspect is flexibility – the ability to adapt, pivot, or shift in response to changes and opportunities. Nanoenterprises show a high level of flexibility due to their small size and simplicity of operations. They can shut down, reopen, or pivot easily as opportunities or challenges arise. In contrast, microenterprises display medium flexibility, often requiring substantial effort and resources to effect meaningful pivots. Gig economy jobs also exhibit high flexibility, primarily due to the inherent nature of gig work which allows workers to swiftly shift roles or platforms based on demand, personal preferences, or changes in the gig marketplace.

Finally, agility to market shifts is an important indicator of the capacity of these entities to respond quickly and effectively to changes in the market environment. In this regard, nanoenterprises demonstrate very low agility to market shifts, primarily due to their resource constraints, limited market information, and technology gaps. Microenterprises exhibit low agility due to similar reasons, although to a lesser degree given their better resources and market positioning. On the other hand, gig economy jobs display moderate to high agility to market shifts, depending largely on the nature of the gig. Those involved in digital gig work, for instance, can respond relatively quickly to market changes due to their reliance on technology platforms that provide real-time market information and trends.

  • Potential and impact
 NanoenterprisesMicroenterprisesGig Economy Jobs
Economic ImpactProvide essential goods and services to local communities, foster local economic development.High (Beyond Community Level) Contribute to local and national economies, can provide employment.High (Service Sector) Contribute to the economy by providing goods or services
Potential for GrowthLow. Have the potential to grow into more sustainable businesses with proper support and interventions.  Moderate to High. Have more potential for growth due to better resources and market access.Moderate to High. Growth potential is highly dependent on the individual’s skills, the demand for their services, and their business strategies.
Gender and developmentMostly women who provide for the needs of the householdMixed (Men and Women)Mixed (Men and Women)

In terms of economic impact, nanoenterprises play a fundamental role in local communities by providing essential goods and services. Despite their small scale, they help foster local economic development and serve as a significant lifeline for local consumers, especially in remote or underserved areas. On the other hand, microenterprises have a more substantial impact that extends beyond the community level. They not only contribute to local economies but also to the national one, providing employment and enhancing local and regional supply chains. Similarly, gig economy jobs significantly contribute to the economy, especially within the service sector. They provide goods or services, often fulfilling niche demands or offering convenience through digital platforms.

The potential for growth varies across these categories. Nanoenterprises have relatively low growth potential due to their resource constraints and other barriers. However, with proper support and interventions, they could evolve into more sustainable businesses. Microenterprises, on the other hand, have moderate to high potential for growth, attributable to their better resources and market access. Likewise, gig economy jobs offer moderate to high growth potential, highly contingent on the individual’s skills, the demand for their services, and their business strategies.

Examining these categories from a gender and development perspective reveals that nanoenterprises are predominantly owned and run by women, often catering to the household’s needs. This characteristic emphasizes the role of these enterprises in empowering women economically and providing them with a source of income. On the contrary, both microenterprises and gig economy jobs present a more mixed picture with both men and women participating, reflecting the broader societal gender roles in the world of work and entrepreneurship.

  • Review of related literature

The rise of nano-enterprises as a driving force in the informal economy cannot be overlooked. These entities, defined as non-salaried individuals running their own businesses outside an employment contract framework, often emerge as alternatives for family income generation or due to the absence of formal employment opportunities (Lagunas, 2021). Frequently, nano-entrepreneurs do not opt for the informal economy out of choice; instead, they are pushed by a lack of opportunities in the formal sector and the absence of alternative means of subsistence.

This trend towards nanoenterprise entrepreneurship has attracted academic attention due to its significant influence on the informal sector. Various scholars (Acs, 2006; De la Garma, 2010) have devoted studies to this phenomenon. Entrepreneurship is globally perceived as a tool to combat poverty and unemployment (Sigalia and Carney, 2012; Rodríguez and Palavicini, 2013; Pazmiño, Merchán, and Jiménez, 2018). However, there’s an argument that ventures in the informal economy function more as a survival option than poverty alleviation (Walton and López, 2005; Delgado, Cruz, and Lince, 2019).

Nanoenterprises are typically characterized by individual ownership and operation. Valdés (2004) identifies a nanoentrepreneur as a self-employed worker who independently carries out commercial activities. Lejarriaga (2003), García and Fernández (2005), and Raydán (2010) all concur with this definition, adding that nano-enterprises are typically operated as sole proprietorships. This understanding is reinforced by the European Observatory for SMEs (2018) and the Ministry of Economy and Business of Spain (2002), which classify nano-entrepreneurs as individuals running their own businesses with complete autonomy.

Nonetheless, the classification and criteria for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises have been criticized for their lack of uniformity globally (McKeown, 2017; Poole, 2018). As Olagboye (2021) proposes, it’s crucial to recognize nano-enterprises as an independent category, separate from micro-enterprises. This is particularly true in Sub-Saharan Africa, where many individual entrepreneurs exist in the informal economy.

The informal economy has long been a point of academic interest, attracting a plethora of terms such as the irregular economy, the subterranean economy, the underground economy, the black economy, the invisible economy, and the shadow economy (Ferman and Ferman, 1973; Gutmann, 1977; Dilnot and Morris, 1981; Simon and Witte, 1982; McCrohan and Smith, 1986; Frey and Schneider, 2000; Charmes, 2012). The consideration of the informal economy as independent of the formal one has led to debates over whether to regulate or eradicate it, especially considering its role as a safety net for the poorest populations (2014b; Williams and Martinez, 2014; Benjamin et al., 2014; Dibben, Wood and Williams, 2015).

Olagboye (2021) defines nano-enterprises as non-employing registered and unregistered businesses operated by a single individual or with the assistance of family members. The author argues that formalizing such enterprises can enhance their legitimacy, promoting them as legitimate contributors to economic growth rather than characterizing them as elements of an illegal economy. In essence, the institutionalization of nanoenterprises, or informal economy enterprises (IEEs), presents an opportunity to shift the paradigm of enterprise development, moving away from a ‘one size fits all’ approach to one that acknowledges the socio-economic peculiarities of different contexts (Olagboye, 2021).

  • Nanoenterprise development and sustainable development goals

Nanoenterprises (NEs), owing to their unique characteristics and inherent agility, can play a pivotal role in the attainment of several United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Through their economic activities, NEs significantly influence poverty reduction, gender equality, decent work and economic growth, industry innovation, reduced inequalities, responsible consumption and production, and the establishment of global partnerships.

SDG 1: No Poverty

As entities often formed out of necessity, NEs directly contribute to poverty reduction (SDG 1). By creating income opportunities, particularly for those with limited access to formal employment, they provide a means of subsistence and financial independence. Although NEs generally function more as a survival option than as a poverty eradication mechanism, with appropriate support and interventions, they can evolve into sustainable businesses, potentially lifting their proprietors out of poverty.

SDG 5: Gender Equality

NEs also play a crucial role in advancing gender equality (SDG 5). Women constitute a significant proportion of nanoentrepreneurs, utilizing their enterprises to provide for their households and attain financial autonomy. By fostering an environment where women can take the reins of their own businesses, NEs promote gender equality and empower women, two critical aspects of SDG 5.

SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth

SDG 8 calls for the promotion of sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all. Although NEs often operate in the informal economy and may not offer the same security as formal employment, they provide a source of income and employment, even for those who might otherwise remain unemployed. With the right institutional and policy support, NEs could potentially transition into the formal economy, promoting decent work and contributing to economic growth.

SDG 9: Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure

Despite operating with limited resources, NEs often demonstrate a high degree of innovation, a key component of SDG 9. This innovation can manifest in various ways, from novel methods of product delivery to creative ways of accessing markets or minimizing costs. While NEs may not contribute significantly to infrastructure development directly, their resilience and growth can spur the need for improved infrastructure, thereby indirectly influencing this aspect of SDG 9.

SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities

NEs inherently foster inclusivity, offering business opportunities to individuals regardless of their social or economic status. In doing so, they play a part in reducing inequalities (SDG 10) by providing avenues for income generation for individuals across the socioeconomic spectrum.

SDG 12: Responsible Consumption and Production

Given their size and scale, NEs can contribute to SDG 12 by promoting responsible consumption and production. They often source materials locally, reducing transport emissions, and due to their small-scale operations, they may generate less waste than larger companies. NEs also have the potential to foster responsible consumption habits within local communities, given their proximity to their customer base.

SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals

Finally, NEs have the potential to contribute to SDG 17 by establishing partnerships with various stakeholders, including other businesses, non-profit organizations, and local governments. These partnerships can foster knowledge sharing, collaboration, and the pooling of resources, enhancing the capacity of NEs to achieve sustainable growth and contribute to other SDGs.

In conclusion, the development and support of NEs could serve as a multi-faceted strategy for achieving several of the SDGs. Although challenges exist, with the right policy and institutional support, NEs have the potential to contribute significantly to sustainable development.

  • Further research
  1. The Imperative of State-led Social Safety Nets for Nanoenterprises: Directions for Further Research

As we delve further into the role and potential of Nanoenterprises (NEs) in socioeconomic development, a pertinent area that warrants in-depth exploration is the provision of social safety nets by governments. More specifically, the need for state-backed health and disaster risk mitigation measures for these enterprises. While private sector participation is crucial, the foundation of these safety nets must be laid and sustained by the state for several reasons.

Ensuring Equal Access and Coverage

State-led safety nets ensure universal access and coverage, particularly for NEs operating in remote or marginalized areas, or those run by individuals who may otherwise be excluded from private sector services due to factors such as low income or lack of collateral. Governments, unlike private organizations, are obligated to provide services to all constituents, ensuring that the most vulnerable NEs are not left unprotected.

Promoting Business Continuity and Resilience

Social safety nets, particularly in health and disaster risk mitigation, promote business continuity and resilience in the face of adversities. NEs, given their small scale and limited resources, are often the most affected by health crises or natural disasters. By providing support in these areas, governments can ensure that NEs can recover from setbacks more effectively and continue to contribute to the economy.

Reducing Financial Vulnerability

NEs are often financially vulnerable, and unexpected costs such as healthcare expenses or disaster-related losses can push them further into poverty. State-provided safety nets can reduce this financial vulnerability, allowing nanoentrepreneurs to invest in their businesses rather than spending their resources on coping with such shocks.

Encouraging Formalization

The provision of social safety nets by the state can serve as an incentive for NEs to formalize. This could, in turn, open doors for them to access other forms of support such as training, funding, and business development services, ultimately contributing to their growth and sustainability.

Future research should focus on the design and implementation of these social safety nets. How can they be made most effective for NEs? How should they be delivered to ensure maximum reach? What role can technology play in their deployment? How can they be financed sustainably? Answering these and other questions will help in devising policies and strategies that will ensure NEs, despite their size, can contribute significantly to the economy while also guaranteeing the welfare of those who run them.

Moreover, there should be a keen interest in studying the partnership dynamics between the state and the private sector in providing these safety nets. Such research would shed light on the potential synergies and areas of conflict, enabling a smoother and more effective collaboration between these two important stakeholders in supporting NEs.

Further research in this area is necessary to not only provide a deeper understanding of the needs and challenges of NEs but also to inform policy decisions and guide the development of programs aimed at supporting these vital economic entities.

  • Private Sector Intervention for Coordination and Consolidation

Another compelling area of inquiry concerns the role the private sector can play in fostering coordination and consolidation to enhance market access for both suppliers and buyers. Particularly, there’s an opportunity for large corporations to form partnerships with Nanoenterprises (NEs), focusing on local sourcing of raw materials rather than importation. These partnerships could reduce the carbon footprint of businesses, stimulate local economies, and foster sustainable development.

Despite the potential capital-intensive nature of these partnerships in the short-term, the long-term benefits to the local economy and the environment are undeniable. State intervention in the form of subsidies and incentives could be essential in promoting such partnerships.

Technology Transfer and Capacity Building

Large corporations often possess advanced technologies and technical know-how that can significantly enhance the productivity and efficiency of NEs. Partnerships between large corporations and NEs can provide an avenue for technology transfer and capacity building, leading to improved output and competitiveness of NEs.

Supply Chain Integration

NEs can be integrated into the supply chains of larger corporations, providing a steady and reliable market for their products or services. This can improve their financial stability, encourage growth, and create employment opportunities.

Financial Support and Investment

Larger corporations could provide much-needed financial support and investment to NEs. This could be in the form of direct funding, or indirectly through facilitating access to credit and other financial services. Such financial support can be crucial for NEs to scale up their operations and enter new markets.

Infrastructure Development

Partnerships with large corporations could also lead to infrastructure development in areas where NEs operate. This can include physical infrastructure like roads and utilities, as well as digital infrastructure like internet connectivity, which can open up new opportunities for NEs.

Further research is needed to understand the most effective ways of fostering these partnerships, the potential barriers and how they can be overcome, and the impact of such partnerships on the economic sustainability of NEs. It would also be beneficial to explore the role of government in facilitating these partnerships, and the types of policies and incentives that could encourage more large corporations to partner with NEs.

Moreover, future studies could also focus on the role of social enterprises and NGOs in bridging the gap between NEs and large corporations, and how these organizations can collaborate with governments to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth.

  • Case Study of SEDPI’s Ethical Financing and Social Safety Nets: Opportunities for Research

A third potential area for research is an in-depth case study of the Social Enterprise Development Partnerships, Inc. (SEDPI) model of microfinance services to Nanoenterprises (NEs). SEDPI’s pioneering work in the field of ethical financing and social safety nets for NEs has led to reduced default rates, and the successful expansion of its branch network and outreach.

SEDPI operates under six foundational principles: financial education, capital infusion rather than loans, profit and risk sharing, loss follows capital, non-profit insurance product, and partnership and cooperation. These principles provide a solid basis for a transformative approach to microfinance that is equitable, empowering, and sustainable.

Impact of Financial Education

An investigation could assess the impact of intensive savings mobilization, universal insurance coverage, provision of investment opportunities, and liberation from oppressive loan products on the economic resilience and sustainability of NEs.

Capital Infusion versus Traditional Loans

Research could compare and contrast the effectiveness of capital infusion versus traditional loans in promoting the growth and sustainability of NEs. It could also examine the benefits and challenges of SEDPI’s co-ownership business partnership model.

Profit and Risk Sharing

An evaluation could be made of the impact of SEDPI’s profit and risk sharing mechanism on the viability of NEs, and how this approach differs from conventional loan systems where debtors shoulder all the risks.

Non-Profit Insurance Product:

A study could analyze the success of SEDPI’s non-profit insurance product, and how this approach to insurance contrasts with profit-oriented models.

Partnership and Cooperation

An exploration could be undertaken of SEDPI’s partnerships with government agencies, civil society, and other like-minded organizations. This research could analyze how these partnerships have contributed to the organization’s success, and what lessons can be learned for other organizations aiming to serve NEs.

In sum, this case study would provide valuable insights into how social safety nets can strengthen the capacity of NEs to cope with emergencies and disasters. By examining how SEDPI’s model has led to lower default rates and enabled the organization to expand its services, this research could inform the development of strategies and policies aimed at promoting sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

Reimagining Farmers as Partners: Leveraging Savings for Credit Risk Mitigation in the Agricultural Sector

Delivered on May 23, 2023 at the Agricultural Credit Policy Council event held at the PICC

Financial inclusion remains an essential factor for sustainable economic development, particularly in the realm of the agricultural sector. Having access to a broad range of financial services – which includes not only credit but also savings, insurance, and money transfer services – equips individuals with the necessary tools to weather financial shocks, invest in opportunities, and subsequently improve their livelihoods.

However, recent data reflects a concerning trend in this regard. Based on the Financial Inclusion Survey of 2021, the percentage of adults in the Philippines with savings sharply declined from 53% in 2019 to 37% in 2021. This dip may be partly attributable to the economic upheavals caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which could have led to reduced household income or increased medical expenses.

Moreover, the utility of savings accounts reflected a similar downturn. In 2019, 76% of account holders actively used their savings accounts, but by 2021, this figure had plunged to a mere 56%. In raw numbers, this decline signifies a decrease of approximately 9.7 million savers, from 38.6 million in 2019 to just 28.9 million in 2021.

Among the sectors most affected by this trend is agriculture, forestry, and fishery (AFF), which, despite making significant contributions to the economy, remains financially underprivileged. The 2021 Financial Inclusion Survey disclosed that only about 30% of the 2.3 million workers engaged in AFF reported having any form of savings. This indicates that less than half (only 30%) of our colleagues in the agri-fishery sector are saving or have savings.

Delving deeper into the data, we find that of those AFF workers who are saving, a mere 27.2% or around 191,000 are saving through formal channels. A significantly larger portion, 82.2% or approximately 577,000 individuals, are resorting to informal means. These statistics illustrate that the sector is severely lagging in formal savings, with a disproportionately higher percentage of informal savers compared to the overall population.

The need for comprehensive financial inclusion strategies

The substantial decrease in the number of savers, especially in the agricultural sector, is indeed disheartening. The trend underscores that simply providing appropriate savings products, while a vital step, is insufficient in addressing the larger issue. Comprehensive strategies that extend beyond the financial sector are required. This means initiatives designed not just to promote savings, but also to increase income, as these two factors are intrinsically linked.

To this end, the proactive role of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) in driving financial inclusion is highly commendable. The BSP’s initiatives towards fostering innovations in savings products design, collaborating with various government agencies to enhance financial services delivery, and launching a financial education strategy to increase financial literacy are all notable steps in the right direction. The ultimate goal of these interventions is to empower individuals with financial capability, which involves not just understanding but also effectively using financial services to improve their lives.

Interconnectivity

While significant strides have been made towards financial inclusion, certain challenges persist. Much of the innovation in the banking sector relies heavily on internet-based technologies. Yet, connectivity remains a significant hurdle in rural areas, where a large portion of the agricultural workforce resides. Additionally, the cost of owning a smartphone, which is often required to access digital financial services, is prohibitive for many farmers.

These challenges, however, are not insurmountable. One potential solution is to increase the presence of agency banking in areas where internet connectivity is weak. Agency banking, which involves non-bank retail outlets providing banking services, can help bridge the gap between the banking sector and the rural populace.

Furthermore, promoting the interoperability of savings products among strong cooperatives within the banking system could also be beneficial. A prime example is the Cebu People’s Multipurpose Cooperative (CBMPC), with its demonstrated capability in managing savings products and five decades of service. By aligning savings products across different financial institutions, we can foster a more inclusive and interconnected financial ecosystem that caters to the needs of the agricultural sector.

Savings product design for financial inclusion

The paradigm within financial institutions must shift from perceiving the economically disadvantaged as unable to save, to recognizing that they indeed can, given appropriate financial products. The importance of this shift becomes evident when considering institutions like the Cebu People’s Multipurpose Cooperative (CBMPC) and the Rural Bank of Solano (RBS), both of which have successfully demonstrated this principle.

Both CBMPC and RBS have designed their savings products with minimal opening and maintaining balances, thereby reducing barriers to entry for those with limited income. By adopting such an approach, these institutions have successfully extended financial services to the unbanked populace.

A distinctive characteristic of these institutions’ approach is the integration of financial education within their product offering. Recognizing that financial literacy is crucial for their clientele, CBMPC and RBS offer resources and programs to enhance understanding of savings and other financial concepts among their customers. This strategy does not only ensure the proper utilization of their products, but it also empowers their customers to make informed financial decisions.

Further reflecting the flexible and customer-centric nature of their product design, CBMPC and RBS allow savings to be used as collateral for loans. This system enables customers to access credit that might have been unattainable otherwise due to lack of traditional collateral. Importantly, the savings used as collateral remain accessible in times of emergencies, sickness, death, or disasters, further enhancing the financial security of their customers.

Credit extension at these institutions is linked with agricultural insurance. This approach mitigates the risk of loan default due to crop loss or other agricultural setbacks. It provides a safety net for both the farmers, who might otherwise be unable to repay loans after a poor harvest, and for the institution, which reduces its credit risk.

The experiences of CBMPC and RBS highlight the potential of well-designed savings products to promote financial inclusion and resilience among disadvantaged groups, such as the agri-fishery sector. By adopting a customer-centric approach, emphasizing financial education, and leveraging insurance and flexible collateral options, financial institutions can support their customers’ financial wellbeing while also managing their own risk.

Enhancing financial resilience in the agricultural sector through savings-secured loans

Savings-secured loans represent a significant innovation in the field of financial services, especially in terms of offering a lifeline in times of emergencies. The unique feature of these loans is that they use a customer’s savings as collateral, which allows the borrower to maintain access to these funds in times of urgent need.

In the agricultural sector, a unique set of financial challenges exist due to the cyclical nature of farming activities and the susceptibility to various risks such as weather, pests, and market fluctuations. Savings-secured loans offer a potential solution to these challenges and could significantly enhance the financial resilience of farmers.

One of the key advantages of savings-secured loans is that they enable farmers to use their savings as collateral. This feature allows them to access larger loans, or loans with more favorable terms, which may have been out of reach otherwise. Given the financial requirements of agricultural activities – significant initial outlays for seeds, fertilizers, equipment, and labor – access to substantial credit is essential. The use of savings as collateral bridges this gap, offering farmers the much-needed financial leverage at the start of the farming season.

For financial institutions, the use of savings as collateral significantly reduces credit risk. In the event a borrower defaults on the loan, the institution has recourse to recover its funds from the savings held as collateral. This safeguard makes the issuance of larger loans to farmers, who are often seen as high-risk borrowers due to the unpredictability of their income, a more viable option.

Beyond immediate financial needs, savings-secured loans also offer long-term benefits. They allow farmers, especially those who are economically disadvantaged, to build a credit history. A robust credit history can enhance their credibility as borrowers and increase their chances of accessing more substantial loans in the future, thereby enabling further growth and investment in their farming activities.

Savings-secured loans also incentivize borrowers to practice financial discipline. The necessity to repay loans promptly to regain access to their savings can motivate farmers to manage their funds wisely and maintain regular repayment schedules. This habit, in turn, fosters financial resilience and stability.

The inclusion of such flexible savings products in the offerings of financial institutions not only serves the customers by providing a financial buffer but also benefits the institution. It reduces the risk of loan default and encourages consistent use of financial services, thus leading to a sustainable and financially inclusive growth model.

From risky clients to partners in development

Farmers are often seen as high-risk clients by financial institutions. This perception arises from a combination of factors that affect farmers more than most other sectors:

  • Income volatility: The farming sector is subject to the volatility of agricultural input costs and the instability of produce prices, which may fluctuate due to factors beyond a farmer’s control.
  • Susceptibility to external shocks: Farmers are at the mercy of weather conditions, pest infestations, diseases, and market changes, all of which can drastically impact income.
  • Lack of collateral: Many farmers lack the necessary assets to pledge as collateral for loans, limiting their access to credit.
  • Lack of credit history: Many farmers have not previously accessed formal financial services, and therefore lack a credit history that would demonstrate their creditworthiness to potential lenders.
  • Limited financial capability: Farmers often have limited financial knowledge and skills, reducing their ability to effectively manage financial products and services.

Despite these challenges, it is essential to acknowledge the crucial role that farmers play in society and the economy. They contribute significantly to food security, a fundamental aspect of any nation’s stability. Additionally, the agricultural sector serves as an economic driver for growth, providing employment opportunities and contributing to GDP.

Therefore, financial institutions need to reassess their view of farmers. They should be seen as partners in development, rather than risky clients. This shift in perspective is crucial in driving inclusive growth and development, especially in economies heavily reliant on agriculture.

To make this partnership successful, financial institutions can adopt the following strategies:

  • Integrating appropriate financial products in credit extension: Products like crop insurance can help mitigate the financial risks associated with farming. Also, savings-secured loans, which use savings as collateral but allow withdrawals in emergencies, can provide farmers with the flexibility they need to manage their financial lives.
  • Providing financial education: Providing financial literacy programs can help farmers better understand and manage financial products and services, improving their financial capability and making them more reliable borrowers.
  • Extending government support: Collaboration with government agencies, especially in areas such as disaster risk reduction, can provide additional safeguards against the inherent risks associated with farming. This collaboration can also facilitate the delivery of financial services to the agricultural sector.

Government support

Active participation of the government in supporting farmers is crucial, especially in providing subsidies and assistance that the private sector may find challenging to cover. For instance, the government can step in to subsidize the cost of farming equipment, high-quality seeds, fertilizers, and irrigation facilities, to reduce the burden on farmers. The government can also subsidize crop insurance, which can serve as a safety net against the loss due to unpredictable events like natural calamities, pest infestations, or market fluctuations.

Furthermore, the government’s role is paramount in implementing disaster risk mitigation strategies and providing post-disaster relief and recovery support. This assistance can ensure the continued delivery of financial services to the agricultural sector, even in the face of adverse events. Such government interventions not only shield farmers from severe financial distress but also make farming a more viable and sustainable profession, encouraging economic growth and food security.

In sum, viewing farmers as partners in development necessitates a change in perspective from financial institutions, along with the provision of appropriate financial products and support mechanisms. This partnership not only promotes financial inclusion among farmers but also contributes to a more resilient and sustainable agricultural sector.

The Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF): A critical examination of the Philippines’ proposed sovereign wealth fund

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are state-owned investment funds that are used by countries to benefit their economies and citizens. They consist of various types of assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other financial instruments, often derived from a nation’s surplus reserves.
 
The concept of SWFs originated in the mid-20th century, pioneered by countries with surplus revenues primarily from commodities like oil. For instance, the Kuwait Investment Authority, established in 1953, is often cited as the first SWF. Over time, many other countries
 
SWFs significantly contribute to economic stabilization. They invest surplus revenues, thereby providing a cushion against economic downturns. For instance, during periods of low oil prices, oil-rich countries can utilize their SWFs to balance any decrease in revenue.
 
It stands out for their long-term investment strategies. Unlike private investors who might focus on short-term gains, SWFs have the advantage of a long-term perspective, enabling them to undertake investments that, despite potential short-term risk or unprofitability, could yield substantial returns in the future.
 
SWFs can profoundly influence a nation’s strategic objectives. By channeling investments into specific sectors or industries, they can promote national priorities, such as infrastructure development, technological progress, or economic diversification. In practice, several oil-rich nations use their SWFs to invest in industries outside of oil, aiming to diversify their economies and reduce oil revenue dependency.
 
Different types of sovereign wealth funds
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) can be classified into four primary types, each reflecting the specific economic goals and policy objectives of their respective countries. These include savings funds, stabilization funds, pension reserve funds, and strategic development SWFs.
 
Savings funds are designed to transform non-renewable assets, such as oil or minerals, into a diversified portfolio of international assets. These funds aim to conserve wealth for future generations once these non-renewable resources are depleted. For instance, the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway falls under this category, as it invests oil revenues to secure future generations’ welfare.
 
Stabilization funds are typically used to insulate the economy from commodity price volatility and other economic shocks. They collect surplus revenue during periods of high commodity prices and release funds into the budget during downturns to help stabilize government revenues and counteract economic cycles. An example is the Russian National Wealth Fund, established to support Russia’s pension system and balance the federal budget in times of oil price volatility.
 
Pension reserve funds are not sources of pension contributions but serve as a buffer to assist the funding of future pension liabilities. These funds are typically invested in a diversified portfolio of assets to generate a steady return over time. The Australian Future Fund is an example of a pension reserve fund.
 
Lastly, strategic development SWFs aim to fulfill specific domestic economic and policy objectives, such as developing certain sectors, promoting economic diversification, or increasing employment. These funds often invest in domestic industries and infrastructure. The Ireland Strategic Investment Fund, for instance, targets sectors that will deliver economic and employment benefits to Ireland.
 
How SWFs are funded
 
The funding sources for Sovereign Wealth Funds can be traced back to a variety of economic activities and reserves depending on the fund’s nature and the country’s economic structure. Common sources of funding include commodity exports, foreign exchange reserves, transfer of assets from other funds, and fiscal surpluses.
 
Commodity exports, particularly of oil and gas, are a significant source of funding for many SWFs. For countries rich in these resources, the revenues generated from their exports can result in significant budget surpluses, which are then channeled into their respective SWFs. Notable examples include the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority funded by oil exports, and the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway funded by oil and gas revenues.
 
Foreign exchange reserves are another crucial source of funding for SWFs. Countries with substantial foreign exchange reserves, often due to a large volume of exports or a significant influx of foreign direct investment, can allocate a portion of these reserves to establish or bolster their SWFs.
 
Some SWFs are also funded through the transfer of assets from other government funds or entities. For instance, an initial corpus for the fund might be sourced from a country’s central bank reserves or a public pension fund.
 
Lastly, fiscal surpluses arising from prudent economic management and strong economic growth can also be channeled into SWFs. Countries that consistently run budget surpluses may choose to invest these funds for future needs or economic stabilization. For example, Singapore’s Government Investment Corporation is funded in part by the country’s budget surpluses.
 
Countries with SWF best practices
 
‘Best practices’ in the context of Sovereign Wealth Funds usually refers to effective and ethical management practices that have proven successful across a range of funds. Some of these practices include establishing clear objectives for the fund, which can guide its investment strategy and help stakeholders understand its purpose. Implementing robust governance and operational frameworks is another key best practice. This involves having clear lines of responsibility and control, as well as efficient processes for decision-making and execution. Finally, transparency and accountability are crucial for maintaining public trust in SWFs. This can involve regular public reporting, independent audits, and strong oversight mechanisms.
 
Several countries are recognized for their adherence to best practices in the management of their SWFs. Among them, Norway, with its Government Pension Fund Global, is frequently lauded for its high transparency and robust governance structure. Singapore’s two SWFs, Temasek Holdings and GIC, are also acknowledged for their clear investment strategies, sound governance, and significant contribution to the country’s economy. Similarly, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) in the United Arab Emirates, one of the largest SWFs in the world, is recognized for its diversified investment portfolio and prudent risk management strategies.
 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world, is primarily funded by the country’s oil revenues. The fund is intended to finance public pensions and prevent the Norwegian economy from overheating due to excessive spending of oil revenues. A standout aspect of the Norwegian fund is its high degree of transparency. It regularly publishes detailed reports about its operations and investments, and it’s known for its strict ethical investment guidelines, which prohibit investments in companies involved in activities such as tobacco production, certain types of weapons manufacturing, and severe environmental damage.
 
Singapore manages two sovereign wealth funds: Temasek Holdings and GIC. These funds are primarily funded by Singapore’s foreign reserves. Their overall goal is to strengthen Singapore’s economy and ensure the well-being of future generations. Temasek Holdings and GIC are renowned for their strong governance structures and clear investment strategies. They are recognized for their strategic investments in a variety of sectors, both domestically and internationally, contributing to the robustness of Singapore’s economy.
 
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) is primarily funded by Abu Dhabi’s oil surplus. Its main objective is to diversify income sources away from oil and stabilize the economy. ADIA is known for its wide-ranging investment portfolio, which spans numerous sectors and asset classes across various countries. This diversified approach helps to spread risk and increases the potential for returns. Additionally, ADIA has a reputation for prudent risk management, which includes a thorough evaluation of potential investments and careful monitoring of its portfolio.
 
Advantages of SWFs
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds serve as an important mechanism for smoothing the impact of volatile commodity prices or trade surpluses, providing economic stability. For instance, when a country experiences a surge in oil prices, it can channel the extra revenue into its SWF. During times of lower prices or economic downturns, the country can use the SWF to compensate for the shortfall, thereby stabilizing the economy. Furthermore, SWFs allow countries to diversify their income sources by investing in various asset classes and industries across different countries, reducing the economic risk associated with over-reliance on a single volatile revenue source, such as oil in the case of many Middle Eastern countries.
 
As state-owned entities, SWFs can afford a longer-term investment horizon than most private investors. This long-term perspective provides SWFs with the advantage of investing in riskier or less liquid assets that may offer higher returns over a longer period, like infrastructure or private equity. Furthermore, their ability to remain patient and hold onto their investments during periods of market volatility allows them to benefit from long-term economic trends and potentially realize higher returns compared to short-term investments.
 
SWFs often invest in sectors that align with their country’s strategic objectives, promoting national development and growth. For instance, a SWF might invest in infrastructure projects, thereby facilitating economic development and job creation. In the case of technology or renewable energy, investments by SWFs can drive innovation and help transition the economy towards a more sustainable model. This alignment of investments with national goals is another crucial advantage of SWFs.
 
The concept of intergenerational equity is central to many SWFs, particularly those funded by revenue from depletable resources like oil. By setting aside and investing a portion of the income derived from these resources, SWFs can ensure that the wealth benefits future generations and not just the current populace. For example, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, one of the world’s largest SWFs, was established to invest the profits from Norway’s oil and gas resources, securing the welfare of future generations long after these resources are exhausted.
 
Disadvantages of SWFs
 
One significant concern surrounding Sovereign Wealth Funds is the potential for mismanagement and corruption. Especially in countries where transparency and oversight mechanisms are lacking, there is a risk that SWFs could be susceptible to such practices. For instance, there have been allegations of corruption and mismanagement in Malaysia’s 1MDB fund, where billions of dollars were reportedly misappropriated. In countries with weak institutional frameworks and regulatory oversight, the large amounts of money managed by SWFs can be prone to misuse, which could lead to significant economic and social implications.
 
Another disadvantage of SWFs is the potential concentration of economic power. With their enormous assets, SWFs have the ability to wield significant influence over markets and corporations, leading to concerns about market manipulation or exerting undue influence. For example, a large investment by a SWF in a particular sector could potentially distort market prices. Additionally, SWFs’ investments could have implications for national security, particularly when they invest in strategic industries of other countries.
 
Large-scale investments by SWFs, particularly in domestic markets, could potentially lead to economic overheating and asset price inflation. By pumping significant amounts of money into specific sectors or asset classes, SWFs could contribute to overvaluation, which can lead to asset bubbles and exacerbate economic instability. For instance, excessive investment in the real estate sector could drive up property prices, making housing unaffordable for many citizens and potentially leading to a property bubble. Thus, while SWFs can contribute to economic growth and stability, they also need to manage their investments carefully to avoid contributing to economic instability.
 
Controversies surrounding SWFs
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds are often criticized for a lack of transparency and opacity in their operations. For example, the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) has faced several allegations and legal actions related to mismanagement and corruption due to its lack of transparency. Similarly, China’s Investment Corporation (CIC) has faced criticism over the lack of clarity surrounding its investment strategy and performance.
 
There is also the risk of political interference in SWFs. The Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) has been viewed as a tool of state policy for geopolitical influence rather than an independent financial institution for profit maximization. Similarly, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) has been closely tied to the ruling family, raising questions about its independence.
 
Large SWFs can also pose a risk to global financial stability. For instance, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) is one of the world’s largest SWFs and its investment decisions can have a significant impact on global markets. Similarly, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) controls a large SWF whose investments can significantly influence global financial markets.
 
The Proposed Maharlika Investment Fund of the Philippines
 
House Bill No. 6398, also known as the Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF) bill, was certified as urgent by President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. The bill’s primary aim is to stimulate economic activity and development in the Philippines through strategic and high-impact infrastructure projects, serving as a new growth catalyst.
 
The proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF) is primarily intended to stimulate the economy in the face of downgraded global growth projections. This comes at a time when the world economy is dealing with several challenges, including debilitating inflation, fluctuating and unstable prices of crude oil and other fuel products due to the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and continuing interest rate hikes in the international financial sector. By supporting strategic and high-impact infrastructure projects, the MIF is envisioned to act as a new catalyst for growth, accelerating economic activity and development in the Philippines.
 
Maharlika Investment Corporation
 
The proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF) will be managed by the Maharlika Investment Corp. (MIC). However, the management and governance of the MIF have come under scrutiny, particularly with the provisions in the Senate MIF bill that would allow foreigners to sit on the board of MIC. Critics, including Rep. Arlene Brosas, argue that this could lead to foreign control over local resources. There are also worries about the potential for “money laundering” due to the discretionary powers given to the Board of Directors, as voiced by Rep. France Castro.
 
President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos has certified the Maharlika Investment Fund bill as urgent, expressing the need for a wealth fund to counter the impact of several economic challenges, including inflation, fluctuating oil prices, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and interest rate hikes. The president believes the fund could stimulate the economy by accelerating the implementation of large infrastructure projects. The urgent certification allows the bill to bypass the normal legislative process, which entails readings and deliberations on three separate days. As a result, the bill could be passed more quickly, but at the risk of lawmakers not having ample time to read and study the proposed measures.
 
Funding MIF
 
The proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF) is expected to receive initial capital from major financial institutions such as the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). However, there are concerns that diverting funds from LBP and DBP to the MIF might affect the availability of funds for farmers and microenterprises, which are the primary clientele of these banks.
 
In addition, the Senate bill reintroduces pension funds such as the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS), and Pag-IBIG as potential investors in the MIF. It should be noted, however, that the participation of these pension funds is voluntary and not mandatory.
 
Moreover, the bill proposes annual contributions from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and other government-owned gaming operators to boost the fund’s capital. It should be noted that these are profits from gaming operations, and diverting them to the MIF could have implications for other sectors funded by these entities.
 
The MIF is expected to raise additional capital through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Philippine Stock Exchange. This implies that the fund will be listed on the stock exchange and shares of the fund will be made available to the public. This move is intended to democratize access to the fund and encourage public participation in the fund’s growth and profits.
 
MIF concerns and criticisms
 
Senator Risa Hontiveros, a vocal critic of the Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF) bill, has expressed several concerns about its quick passage and potential implications. She pointed out the depletion of income from the Malampaya oil and gas fields and the yet-to-be-passed law aimed at boosting the government’s income from mining operations. She also warned against the use of highly profitable funds of government financial institutions like Land Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines, which she argues could negatively impact farmers and small businesses. Additionally, Hontiveros raised concerns about the potential risks of using Bangko Sentral funds, highlighting their role in safeguarding against peso depreciation, price increases, and loan interest rate hikes.
 
The Makabayan Bloc in the House of Representatives, a coalition of left-leaning legislators, has not been silent about their concerns surrounding the proposed Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF). A central theme of their criticism is the potential for the MIF to have transparency issues, given the amount of public funds it will manage and the potential for the fund to fall under the influence of political interests. They also questioned the necessity of creating a new fund, suggesting that existing national agencies could be restructured or optimized to fulfill similar goals. Additionally, the Bloc has expressed fears that the MIF might be used as a tool for political patronage, potentially leading to corruption as large sums of public funds could come under the control of a select few individuals.
 
Recommendations
 
The Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF), recently proposed in the Philippines, has stirred a mix of hope and concern among stakeholders. The MIF, designed to stimulate economic growth through strategic infrastructure projects, could serve as a new catalyst for development amidst global economic uncertainties. However, the proposed fund has been met with skepticism and criticism due to a variety of issues, such as concerns over governance, transparency, the source of funding, and the lack of clear investment guidelines. Despite these concerns, the bill has been certified as urgent by President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., signifying the need to kick-start this initiative for the economic future of the nation.
 
Strong governance structures should be at the heart of the Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF) and its managing entity, the Maharlika Investment Corporation (MIC). These structures should foster a culture of professionalism, transparency, and accountability while incorporating robust checks and balances to mitigate the potential for mismanagement or misuse of funds. This foundational recommendation, when well implemented, would pave the way for confidence, both domestically and internationally, in the operations of the MIF.
 
Enhanced transparency is a key necessity for the MIF, considering the high stakes involved and the significant public interest. The fund should be mandated to provide regular, comprehensive, and publicly accessible reports of its activities, investments, and returns. These transparency measures will serve as a deterrent against corruption and engender a sense of public trust and accountability in the fund’s management.
 
To alleviate concerns surrounding the source of funds, the MIF should primarily draw from the General Appropriations Act and contributions from the private sector. Existing financial institutions, such as the Land Bank, Development Bank of the Philippines, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the surplus of GOCCs, are already serving their respective mandates and may not possess the surplus funds to sustainably contribute to the MIF. Therefore, it’s crucial to diversify and clarify the fund’s financial structure to ensure its viability and reassure stakeholders.
 
Establishing clear investment guidelines is another critical step for the MIF. These guidelines should be detailed, aligning with the country’s overarching economic goals and sustainability principles. To ensure effective and timely execution, the MIF should ideally concentrate on a maximum of three specific investment areas per year. Such focus will minimize the risk of spreading resources too thinly and not being able to bring projects to completion.
 
The implementation of MIF should be gradual, allowing for continual refinements based on real-time learning and feedback. This cautious approach can help mitigate risks, manage unintended consequences, and increase the fund’s adaptability in a dynamic economic landscape.
 
The inclusion of regular external audits and oversight in the MIF’s operational structure can provide an additional layer of checks and balances. These audits should be carried out by reputable external entities and serve to reinforce good governance and transparency in the management of the fund.
 
Existing government institutions be strengthened to more effectively fulfill their mandates. This approach helps to avoid duplication of efforts and allows resources to be directed more efficiently. The MIF should refrain from investing in areas where other government institutions are already capable of delivering results, preventing redundancy and fostering greater efficiency in the allocation of public funds.
 
The establishment of the Maharlika Investment Fund (MIF) represents a significant and necessary step forward for the Philippine economy, particularly in the face of current economic challenges. This initiative, however, should be balanced with the implementation of robust safeguards to ensure the maintenance of financial stability and the protection of public interest.
 
Success of the MIF hinges on more than its mere establishment; prudent and transparent management is crucial. This fund will need to navigate a complex economic landscape while maintaining trust and demonstrating fiscal responsibility. A series of recommendations have been provided with this balance in mind, aimed at guiding the MIF towards achieving its economic goals and maintaining public trust.
 
The success of MIF will not only be a testament to its management’s acumen but also to the fund’s foundational principles of governance, transparency, and accountability. These guiding principles will be essential to ensuring that the MIF can effectively stimulate economic activity and development, whilst also safeguarding public interest and financial stability. This holistic approach to the MIF’s establishment and operation is fundamental to its ability to serve as a new catalyst for growth within the Philippines.

SEDPI, Tumutugon sa Kalamidad: Relief Operations at Pagsusulong ng Resilient Housing sa Davao del Norte at Agusan del Sur

Nitong ika-16 ng Marso, 2023, nagsagawa ang Social Enterprise Development Partnerships Inc. (SEDPI) ng relief operations sa mga lugar na apektado ng Low Pressure Area sa Carmen, Davao del Norte at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Ang organisasyon ay tumugon sa mga pangangailangan ng mga tao sa mga apektadong lugar sa pamamagitan ng SEDPI KaTambayayong na isang uri ng damayan system.

Batay sa datos na nakalap ng SEDPI, apektado ang 193 sa 1,097 members sa Carmen, Davao del Norte, habang sa Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur ay 38 sa 1,251 members ang apektado ng Low Pressure Area. Ayon sa mga members sa lugar, umabot ang tubig hanggang bewang at leeg. Karamihan sa mga residente ay pansamantalang tumira sa mga kalsada at sa municipal gymnasium bilang evacuation center.

Nagbibigay ang SEDPI KaTambayayong ng life, sickness, calamity, fire, funeral, at accident assistance benefits. Kasama sa calamity benefit ang relief goods at PhP250 cash. Ang mga benefits na ito ay karaniwang naibibigat sa mga members sa loob lamang ng isa o dalawang araw, na labis na mas mabilis kumpara sa 3 hanggang 6 na buwan na claims processing ng karaniwang insurance company. Ang mga benepisyong ito ay eksklusibo lamang sa SEDPI members at maaring nagbabago depende sa nakolektang pondo. Noong 2021 at 2022, umabot sa PhP4.6M at 5.9M ang kabuuang naipamigay na benepisyo sa mga SEDPI KaTambayayong members.

Bagaman umabot na ang relief operations sa mga lugar na ito, hindi pa rin sapat ang mga tulong na ipinagkakaloob upang tugunan ang lahat ng pangangailangan ng mga apektadong residente. Kailangan ng mga solusyong tumutugon sa pinagmumulan mismo ng problema. Una na rito ang paglipat sa mga residente mula sa mga hazard prone areas papunta sa mga safe zones. Pangalawa, ang pagbibigay ng abot-kayang pabahay sa mga residente. At pangatlo, ang pagkakaroon ng disenyo ng bahay na angkop sa lugar at sa kalamidad.

Upang matulungan ang mga miyembro nito, ang SEDPI ay kasalukuyang nagsasagawa ng socialized housing, SEDPI Building Adequate Livable Affordable and Inclusive (BALAI) communities, na naglalayong magbigay ng maayos at disaster resilient housing sa mga low-income members. Ang organisasyon ay nakikipagtulungan din sa pamahalaan, social investors, at civic organizations upang magbigay ng abot-kayang pabahay sa mga nangangailangan.

Fragile recovery persists among nanoenterprises post pandemic

Update 18 of SEDPI’s Rapid Community Assessment (RCA)
October – December 2022

As the world slowly recovers from the pandemic, the economic landscape remains uncertain, especially for nanoenterprises. A recent survey conducted by our organization, Social Enterprise Development Partnerships, Inc. (SEDPI), reveals that 99% of nanoenterprises have resumed operations as of December 2022, indicating a promising recovery for this crucial sector of the economy.

Despite the positive news, recovery remains fragile with 52% of nanoenterprises surveyed experiencing weak demand. Access to supplies has been a continuing concern with 27% of nanoenterprises still reporting difficulties in obtaining the necessary supplies.

SEDPI’s latest self-rated poverty survey reveals that the impact of the pandemic on poverty levels remains significant. For 2022, 54% of respondents rated themselves at the poverty line, a decrease from 81% in 2021. The number of respondents who rated themselves as poor is steady at 3% and 4%. On a positive note, the number of respondents who no longer consider themselves poor nearly tripled from 16% in 2021 to 41% in 2022.

According to the Social Weather Stations, which conducts the survey at the national level, self-rated poverty was recorded at 48% in 2021 and 51% in 2022. The considerably elevated self-rated poverty at the national level suggest that a greater number of nanoenterprises that SEDPI serves experienced better economic conditions.

Over the past three years, SEDPI has conducted an impact assessment to evaluate its support for nanoenterprises through self-evaluation or perception surveys. The results are as follows:

 Dec 19Dec 21Dec 22
Help in growing business82%100%98%
Education of children70%85%98%
Improve housing67%99%98%
Improve nutrition81%100%100%
Increase income82%100%97%

The perception survey suggests that SEDPI’s assistance plays a crucial role in alleviating hardships among nanoenterprises in areas such as business growth, education, housing, nutrition, and income. This may be the reason why the highly significantly lower self-rated poverty data among SEDPI nanoenterprises compared to the national survey. Additional interventions and strategies in the areas of disaster risk reduction, housing and health are necessary to enable a more comprehensive and lasting escape from poverty.

The majority of respondents are nanoenterprises (45%), owned and operated by women, with an average age of 43 and 73% being married. Of these nanoenterprises, 40% rely on other sources of income, such as employment, while 12% are unpaid family members, and 2% are unemployed.

SEDPI is a microfinance institution dedicated to providing ethical financing to nanoenterprises in Agusan del Sur, Davao de Oro, Davao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur. Their efforts have led to significant improvements in various aspects of the beneficiaries’ lives, such as business growth, education, housing, nutrition, and income.

Resilience and Recovery: A Chronological Analysis of Nanoenterprises Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound impact on nanoenterprises (NEs) worldwide, with various stages of recovery, demand trends, and access to supplies experienced throughout the course of the pandemic. This article examines the chronological analysis of NEs’ recovery, demand trends, and access to supplies from March 2020 to December 2022, based on the Rapid Community Assessment conducted by the Social Enterprise Development Partnerships, Inc. (SEDPI). By analyzing these trends, we can better understand the challenges faced by NEs and the factors contributing to their resilience and adaptability.

March 2020: Initial Pandemic Impact, Demand Shift, and Supply Chain Disruptions

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, 34% of NEs stopped their operations due to lockdowns and social distancing measures, while 66% resumed operations. Demand was characterized by 8% of NEs experiencing no buyers, 78% experiencing weak demand, and 13% witnessing strong demand, as consumers’ priorities shifted towards essential goods and services. Supply chain disruptions affected NEs, with 36% facing difficult access to supplies and 64% having access to necessary resources.

June 2020: Early Recovery, Persistent Weak Demand, and Supply Chain Struggles

In June 2020, the recovery of NEs continued, with 91% resuming operations and only 9% remaining closed. However, demand remained weak, with 7% of NEs having no buyers, 72% facing weak demand, and 21% enjoying strong demand. Access to supplies was a significant challenge, as 81% of NEs had adequate access while 19% faced difficulties due to ongoing supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic.

December 2020: Relief, Recovery, Improved Demand, and Better Supply Access Amid Typhoon Vicky’s Impact

By December 2020, government relief packages and easing of lockdown restrictions helped many NEs recover, with 3% remaining closed and 96% resuming operations. Demand improved slightly, with 4% of NEs having no buyers, 75% facing weak demand, and 21% enjoying strong demand. The holiday season likely contributed to increased consumer spending. Access to supplies significantly improved, with 90% of NEs having access and only 10% experiencing difficulties.

However, during this period, Typhoon Vicky hit the region, causing agricultural production losses in rice, corn, high-value crops, and livestock. The typhoon also triggered floods and landslides, resulting in damaged or destroyed homes in coastal areas. The natural disaster added challenges to the recovery process of nanoenterprises, particularly those in the affected areas and those dependent on agricultural production. Although the overall trend in December 2020 indicated progress in recovery, improved demand, and better access to supplies for nanoenterprises, the recovery would have been even more significant if not for the added challenges brought about by Typhoon Vicky.

March 2021: Steady Recovery, Increased Strong Demand, and Improved Supply Access

By March 2021, the situation for NEs had improved, with 97% resuming operations and only 3% remaining closed. Demand patterns shifted, with only 1% of NEs having no buyers, 52% experiencing weak demand, and 47% enjoying strong demand, likely due to the easing of restrictions and ongoing vaccination campaigns. Access to supplies improved, with 73% of NEs having adequate access and 27% still facing difficulties.

June 2021: Full Recovery, Diverse Demand, and Enhanced Access to Supplies

By June 2021, 100% of NEs resumed operations, marking a full recovery in this period. Demand varied, with 2% of NEs having no buyers, 64% facing weak demand, and 34% experiencing strong demand. Access to supplies continued to improve, with 82% of NEs having adequate access and only 18% facing difficulties.


September 2021: Delta Variant Surge, Granular Lockdowns, and Nanoenterprise Adaptation


In September 2021, the Delta variant surged in the Philippines, prompting the government to implement granular lockdowns as opposed to the general lockdowns previously imposed. This new approach aimed to prevent the wholesale disruption of jobs and livelihoods while still addressing the public health crisis. Despite the surge and the implementation of granular lockdowns, 96% of NEs continued to operate, while only 4% temporarily stopped their operations.

Demand patterns during this period fluctuated, with 12% of NEs having no buyers, 66% experiencing weak demand, and 22% witnessing strong demand. As the granular lockdowns targeted specific areas with high infection rates, many nanoenterprises had to quickly adapt to the changing circumstances and market conditions. Access to supplies remained relatively stable, with 77% of NEs having adequate access and 23% facing difficulties.

The September 2021 period demonstrated the resilience of nanoenterprises in the face of new challenges posed by the Delta variant and the government’s shift in lockdown strategy. Despite the hurdles, the sector continued to adapt and maintain its operations, contributing to the nation’s economic recovery.

December 2021: Continued Recovery, Increased Strong Demand, and Moderate Access to Supplies

By December 2021, widespread vaccination campaigns allowed for more relaxed social distancing measures and a resurgence in consumer demand. The percentage of stopped NEs remained at 3%, while 97% resumed operations. Demand for NE products and services further improved, with 9% of NEs having no buyers, 65% facing weak demand, and 26% experiencing strong demand. Access to supplies became more moderate, with 77% of NEs having access and 23% facing difficulties.

March 2022: Steady Operations, Persistent Weak Demand, and Improved Access to Supplies

By March 2022, the status of operations remained consistent, with 4% of NEs stopped and 96% resumed operations. Demand continued to lean towards weakness, as 8% of NEs had no buyers, 67% faced weak demand, and 26% experienced strong demand. However, access to supplies significantly improved, with 85% of NEs having access and only 15% facing difficulties.

September 2022: Temporary Setbacks, Fluctuating Demand, and Slightly Reduced Access to Supplies

In September 2022, the temporary increase in stopped NEs to 4% could be attributed to localized outbreaks and new COVID-19 variants. Despite these setbacks, 96% of NEs remained operational. However, demand patterns fluctuated, with 15% of NEs having no buyers, 36% experiencing weak demand, and 49% witnessing strong demand. Access to supplies slightly declined, with 73% of NEs having access and 27% facing difficulties.

December 2022: High Inflation Impact on Nanoenterprises, Demand Patterns, and Purchasing Power

In December 2022, the Philippines’ headline inflation increased to 8.1 percent, as reported by the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). The high inflation rate led to a decrease in purchasing power, resulting in reduced consumer spending, particularly among low-income households. Despite the inflationary pressures, 99% of NEs remained operational, while only 1% stopped their operations, showcasing the resilience of the sector. 

Compared to September 2022, when 36% of NEs faced weak demand, the percentage increased to 52% in December 2022, illustrating the heightened challenges for these enterprises due to reduced consumer spending amid high inflation. The decreased purchasing power of consumers, especially in low-income households, contributed to the fluctuations in demand patterns for nanoenterprises.

Access to supplies remained relatively stable, with 73% of NEs having access to necessary resources and 27% facing difficulties in acquiring them. The December 2022 period highlighted the challenges faced by nanoenterprises due to high inflation and its impact on consumer spending, while also demonstrating the adaptability of the sector in sustaining operations amid economic challenges.

Conclusion:

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and various external challenges, such as natural disasters and high inflation, nanoenterprises have consistently demonstrated resilience and adaptability in maintaining operations, responding to fluctuating demand, and navigating supply chain disruptions. As of December 2022, the sector has reached a near full recovery, with stabilizing demand patterns and steady access to supplies. The findings from SEDPI’s Rapid Community Assessment underscore the importance of continued support and empowerment for nanoenterprises, as they play a crucial role in local economies and communities. As the world moves forward from the pandemic’s impact, fostering collaboration between government, business, and community organizations will remain vital in ensuring the sustained success and growth of nanoenterprises in the face of ongoing and future challenges.

Respondents:

In December 2022, the Rapid Community Assessment (RCA) conducted by SEDPI garnered responses from 1,398 respondents across the provinces of Agusan del Sur, Davao de Oro, Davao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur. The profile of respondents in this edition of the survey was similar to that of previous editions. The majority of respondents were female (86%), with an average age of 43, and 73% of them were married. When it came to sources of income, 40% were employed, 45% were nanoenterprise owners, 12% were unpaid family members contributing to the family business, and 2% were unemployed.

Nanoenterprise status

 Mar’20Jun ’20Dec ’20Mar’21Jun ’21Sep ’21Dec 21Mar ’22Sep’ 22Dec 22
Stopped34%9%3%3%0%4%3%4%4%1%
Resumed66%91%96%97%100%96%97%96%96%99%

Market demand for NE products and services

 Mar’20Jun ’20Dec ’20Mar’21Jun ’21Sep ’21Dec 21Mar ’22Sep’ 22Dec 22
No buyers8%7%4%1%2%12%9%8%15%6%
Weak demand78%72%75%52%64%66%65%67%36%52%
Strong demand13%21%21%47%34%22%26%26%49%42%

Access to supplies for NE livelihood operations

 Mar’20Jun ’20Dec ’20Mar’21Jun ’21Sep ’21Dec 21Mar ’22Sep’ 22Dec 22
With access64%81%90%73%82%77%77%85%73%73%
Challenge in access36%19%10%27%18%23%23%15%27%27%

Profile of nanoenterprises

Nanoenterprises are typically unregistered livelihoods of self-employed individuals or informal solo-preneurs with asset size ranging from PhP3,000 to PhP150,000. They operate businesses alone or with the help of unpaid family members targeting their immediate local communities. Microenterprises are mostly registered enterprises able to hire employees albeit on a minimum wage rate. There are approximately 8.1 million nanoenterprises in the Philippines as of 2022.[1]

Most government programs and private sector engagement fall under the banner of microenterprises, that grossly misrepresents the needs and largely excludes the magnitude of nanoenterprises. Making nanoeterprises visible means more effective and customized policies and programs that should provide them the opportunity to grow into a more sustainable enterprise that would lift them out of poverty.[2]

There are 30 million Filipinos considered as poor based on a survey the Department of Social Welfare and Development conducted in 2022.[3] Directly addressing the needs of the 8.1 million estimated nanoenterprise will reduce this number by 27% which is a great leap forward for a truly inclusive Philippine economic development.[4]

The table below is a brief summary that compares and contrasts nanoenterprises from microenterprises.[5]

 NanoenterpriseMicroenterprise
AssetsPhP3,000 to PhP150K>PhP150K to PhP3M
Employees01 to 9
Approximate number8,100,0001,000,000
Enterprise registrationMostly unregisteredMostly registered
Economic statusMostly poorMostly non-poor

This paper attempts to provide a more comprehensive profile of nanoenterprises in terms of the following: livelihood characteristics, access to finance, market participation, coping mechanisms in times of emergencies – climate crisis and disasters, digital inclusion, and access to government programs and services.

Livelihood characteristics

Examples of nanoenterprises include sari-sari stores operators, carinderia, small holder farmers and fisherfolks, dressmakers, and ambulant vendors. Those who participate in the gig economy are also largely considered as nanoenterprises such as delivery riders, and ride share drivers. Freelancers could also be considered as nanoenterprise such as graphic artists, video editors, content creators, writers etc.

Nanoenterprises use rudimentary and obsolete equipment in manufacturing products or delivering services or they may have more advanced equipment that they lease. Microenterprises typically have better equipment and have ownership of these.

Most nanoentarprises are individuals who typically have low educational levels and hardly maintain bookkeeping records. Microenterprises typically have higher educational levels compared to nanoenterprises and could maintain some level of record keeping. Microenterprises also pay business permits and taxes that nanoenterprises hardly pay since they are mostly unregistered.

Both nano and microenterprises lack managerial and technical skills to grow their livelihood and are forced to be entrepreneurs due to lack of employment opportunities. They also have limited access to technology, information and financing that leads to low productivity and low product quality.

Access to finance

Nanoenterprises heavily rely on loans to afford basic needs – food, education, shelter utilities –  and recover from a disaster. Loans are also typically used to grow their livelihoods and to finance major life events such wedding, anniversaries and death. 

NEs typically access loans from informal sources which make them vulnerable to predatory financing practices. Aside from this, most of them also borrow money from cooperatives, rural banks, microfinance NGOs and pawnshops. Majority also borrow from family and friends albeit in limited amounts.

This goes to show how NEs are trapped in debt. There are very few savings and insurance products available in the market that cater to their needs and preferences – simple, fast, accessible and affordable. Savings and insurance products are more appropriate for disaster risk mitigation and financing major life events. Microfinance institutions, in their continuous drive for growth and profitability, aim to increase their loan portfolio. It is also far simpler for MFIs to offer loans and gain profit to address NE needs compared to designing savings and insurance products for profit that address the same. This are the reasons why most MFIs use loans as the financial product to address livelihood needs, coping in times of emergencies and financing major life events. 

It has been shown that low-income individuals can save and will pay premium for insurance if these financial products are designed according to their needs and preferences.[6] Most NEs have extremely limited savings and insurance coverage due to the lack of financial product that directly cater to their needs and preferences. 

On average, nanoenterprises borrow a small sum of money ranging from PhP3,000 to PhP20,000 to finance their livelihoods. Although in the proposed definition of naneoneterprises, their loans could be up to PhP150,000.[7]

Microfinance institutions offer them short-term, collateral-free loans to them usually payable in three to six months with interest rates ranging from 2% to 5% per month. SEDPI, a microfinance institution, has a loan portfolio composed of 95.7% with less than PhP20,000 in terms of loan size. Four percent (4%) of loans extended are greater than Php20,000 but less than PhP50,000. A miniscule 0.3% have loans greater than PhP50,000.

Market participation

High cost of raw materials, labor, limited market access, lack of market information, outdated technology, inadequate services and infrastructure hampers overall business environment of NEs. The poor are more than mere victims of circumstance. They are creative individuals. A major barrier preventing NEs from exiting poverty is the problematic market environment. An effective development strategy is to remove the barriers that stand in the way of NE’s ability to help themselves and enhance their ability to participate in markets.

Developing markets and improvements in market linkages and market infrastructure will strengthen the participation of NEs in value chains. The government and development organizations should design programs that lead to sustainable solutions. These interventions should be designed using the following development principles – achieves high impact, specific and focused interventions, sustainable, cost-effective and market-driven.[8]

Coping mechanisms in times of emergencies

The Philippines topped the world disaster risk index in 2022. The Philippines scored high in its exposure, vulnerability, susceptibility, lack of coping capacities, and lack of adaptive capacities in the face of disasters.[9] Impacts of climate change and the global economic crisis are compounding the threats faced by people living in poverty around the world.[10]

The top coping mechanisms, pre-pandemic, of NEs in times of extreme natural events are accessing loans, finding additional work, asking for help from family members, assistance from government and charitable institutions, and selling of assets. Other coping mechanisms mentioned were saving, praying, damayan ang insurance.[11]

Loans topping the coping mechanisms is not surprising but a lot are not aware that this is not good for one’s financial health. Loans should be used for productive purposes only, a cardinal rule when borrowing money. In times of emergencies, loans will be used for consumption – to buy food, rebuild or repair houses, medicines for the sick etc. The loan purpose is not bad but the financial product used is incompatible with the purpose. There is no return from the loan use and loans accessed in times of emergencies typically have high interest rates.

The appropriate financial tool used should be insurance and savings. It is a stark contrast that these two are at the bottom of the coping mechanism strategies of the poor while accessing loans is on top. Insurance is specifically design as a protection strategy against emergencies and external shocks. Savings on the other hand provides a cushion or a buffer to smoothen the impact of financial shocks.

The pandemic made matters worse for NEs since this added to their vulnerabilities – extreme natural events due to the effects of climate crisis. During this period, the coping mechanisms of NEs changed. This time the top coping mechanism used was getting assistance from the government. This was followed by insurance, savings, accessing loans, damayan and distress selling of assets.[12] When strict lockdowns were enforced, NEs could not operate their livelihoods that’s why they did not seek loans as a top coping mechanism. Finding additional work was not mentioned as a coping mechanism unlike before the pandemic. Mobility restrictions imposed during lockdowns prevented NEs from working.

Insurance and savings ranked higher in the coping strategies during the pandemic which is an improvement when these two were at the bottom before the pandemic. This is because microfinance institutions offering savings and insurance products have already penetrated all municipalities in the Philippines. There was less market penetration a decade earlier that made these products inaccessible then. 

Although access to savings and insurance products already improved, there are still opportunities for improvement to make these more effective. For example, microfinance institutions should promote savings mobilization rather than provision of higher loan amounts to finance the growth of NEs. MFIs should not merely treat savings from its borrowers as collateral to loans but also a means to smoothen expenditures especially in times of emergencies. 

Insurance products for NEs could be improved by offering coverage for disasters that would enable them to restart their livelihoods so that NEs need not be too dependent on loans. Turnaround time in processing claims could also be improved from current practices which takes months due to voluminous documentary requirements. These all could be simplified through streamlining processes and procedures.

Digital inclusion

The Philippines has been dubbed as the social media capital of the world. Meltwater, an Oslo-based social listening and social media analytics company, ranks the Philippines as second in the world in terms of social media use.[13]However, this social media use does not seem to translate to positive economic changes, especially to the poor. 

Digital Inclusion refers to the activities necessary to ensure that all individuals and communities, including the most disadvantaged, have access to and use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).[14] Internet access and ownership of gadgets are therefore important in order to take advantage of opportunities in the digital age. This is where the challenge starts for NEs since only 40% of them have access to the internet, 52% of have smart phones and only 8% have laptops.[15] Aside from this, there is also the challenge of the cost of smart phones and internet subscription. NEs, especially in the rural areas, have difficulty getting mobile phone signals due to lack of infrastructure.[16] Not owning a phone, having basic phones and limited access to the internet prevents NEs from accessing information and taking advantage of opportunities online. 

These ICT challenges of NEs constrained their participation in e-commerce. SEDPI’s research shows that in 2022 only 19% of NEs are into online selling and 13% buy products online. There was a short-lived participation in e-commerce in 2021 but this was not sustained due to the lifting of mobility restrictions and high cost of deliveries of products ordered online.[17]

Digital financial inclusion among NEs is low. Only 23% of them have bank accounts, 3% have mobile wallets and 3% know how to do online banking.[18]

Access to government programs and services.

At the personal level, they also lack civil registry documents such as birth certificates and marriage certificates that makes it challenging for them to access government welfare services such as SSS, Pag-IBIG and PhilHealth. These civil registry documents are typically required to get government identification cards such as a driver’s license, voter’s ID, passports. These government-issued identification cards are then required to apply for membership in SSS, Pag-IBIG, PhilHealth and other government programs.

Due to the lack of government-issued identification cards, NEs experienced delays in getting the cash assistance program the government provided to its citizens during the pandemic. Lockdowns started on March 14, 2020.[19] A month after, only 60% of NEs under SEDPI received cash assistance. This improved to 98% by the end of the month when local government units started easing requirements.[20]

As of May 2021, there are 3.36M self-employed individuals who are members of the SSS. This is the membership classification where NEs fall. However, they comprise minority since self-employed members also include professionals, proprietors of businesses, farmers, fisherfolks and the informal sector. Even if the 3.36M self-employed members of SSS were all considered as NEs, this will only make up 41% of the 8.1M estimated NEs.

Nanoenterprises lack support from the government because they are lumped with the microenterprise sector. Nano and microenterprises clearly have different profile, behavior and needs. Microenterprises are defined as having up to Php150,000 in assets as defined under the Republic Act 8425 (Social Reform Agenda) and Republic Act 10693 (Microfinance NGO Act). However, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas defines loans extended to microenterprises at a maximum of PhP300,000. Meanwhile, the Department of Trade of Industry defines microenterprises as entities with up to PhP3M in assets.

In reality, MFIs serve mostly NEs, who are considered mostly poor, but have financial products and services designed for MEs, who are considered mostly non-poor. Financial products designed for microenterprises focus more on repayment history, capacity to pay and using savings as collateral. These designs are inappropriate for NEs since they face more vulnerabilities. There should be more social safety net mechanisms for financial product designed for NEs such as using savings for emergency purposes, capacity building for livelihood development, insurance coverage for disasters and subsidies from the government.

The inconsistencies in the definition of various government agencies on what microenterprises are, barring the fact that nanoenterprises are rendered invisible, leads to ineffective and inappropriate policies and programs. Microfinance institutions design their financial products and services according to the criteria set by government financial institutions geared towards microenterprises. Thus, the needs and financial product preferences of NEs are not addressed which may explain why they have a hard time escaping poverty. 

Way forward

Making nanoenterprises separate and distinct from microenterprises means more effective and customized policies and programs that should provide them the opportunity to grow into a more sustainable enterprise that would lift them out of poverty.

A more robust welfare and social safety net programs should be in place to allow NEs to not just cope or survive in their current situation but to recover and thrive to transition as a micro or even a small enterprise. This strategy would complement existing market-based approaches that would reduce vulnerabilities of NEs. 

The sheer number of nanoenterprises as distinguished from microenterprises should make them more visible to the government and private sector. Upscaling nanoenterprises renders tremendous multiplier effect. If NEs eventually transition as MEs, they will provide employment that starts at the bottom of the pyramid. They should be recognized as a pillar in socio-economic development since lifting them out of poverty will propel the Philippines to a developed country through inclusive growth.


[1] https://vincerapisura.com/a-case-for-nanoenterprises/

[2] https://vincerapisura.com/a-case-for-nanoenterprises/

[3] https://www.rappler.com/nation/filipino-families-living-in-poverty-2022-dswd/

[4] https://vincerapisura.com/a-case-for-nanoenterprises/

[5] https://vincerapisura.com/a-case-for-nanoenterprises/

[6] The poor and their money

[7] https://vincerapisura.com/a-case-for-nanoenterprises/

[8] Morgan, Mary, Making Markets Work for the Poor: A Reader, Southern New Hampshire University, June 2006

[9] https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/847535/philippines-tops-world-disaster-risk-index-2022-ndrrmc-took-note-of-report/story

[10] https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/09/worlds-poor-bearing-the-brunt-of-global-crises-stresses-un-rights-expert/

[11] Based on SEDPI’s research conducted in 2008 with Opportunity International, 2014 with Cordaid and 2015 with People In Need. There were 79 FGDs conducted all over the Philippines.

[12] SEDPI conducted a research in 2020 in CARAGA region to determine coping mechanisms used by NEs during the pandemic.

[13] https://www.meltwater.com/en/blog/social-media-statistics-philippines

[14] https://inclusivedocs.com/web-accessibility/what-is-digital-inclusion-and-why-is-it-important/

[15] Based on SEDPI research

[16] Ph data: Schumacher and Kent, “8 charts on internet use around the world as countries grapple with COVID-19,” Pew Research Center, April 2, 2020

[17] Based on SEDPI research

[18] Based on SEDPI research

[19] Santos, Ana P. (March 17, 2020). “Coronavirus: Philippines quarantines island of 57 million people”. Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 20, 2020.

[20] Based on SEDPI research

A case for nanoenterprises

According to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), there are nearly a million microenterprises in the Philippines. DTI considers any business with less than PhP3 million in assets and less than 10 employees as microenterprise.

The challenge with this classification in the social development perspective is that it lumps together poor and non-poor enterprises in one huge bucket. It attempts to describe a very broad base enterprises that have largely varied capacity in terms of management capacity, use of technology, access to finance, and general sophistication of products and services offered. 

Enterprise classification in the Philippines

 Assets# of employeesApproximate number
Large>PhP200M≥2005,000
Medium>PhP15 to PhP200M100 to 1995,000
Small>PhP3 to PhP1510 to 99106,000
Micro Up to PhP31 to 91,000,000

                       Source: Department of Trade and Industry

This paper intends to provide a case for nanoenterprises that is distinct and separate from microenterprises. The purpose is to aid in policy development for the government, as well as program intervention design and implementation of development organizations, so that their needs are addressed at its core.

The lowest asset base of a microenterprise in DTI’s definition is vague since it could mean as low as one peso or no asset at all. The microenterprise category is very important because this is where the poor belongs. However, microenterprises that have assets greater than a million pesos could not be classified as poor. 

What is a nanoenterprise?

Government policies and programs of development organizations can better respond to the needs of the poor belonging to the microenterprise sector if there is a clear delineation between poor and non-poor microenterprises. Poor mircoenterprises are rendered invisible since non-poor microenterprise needs are prioritized and is the basis for most policies, programs and engagement. 

Let us use nanoenterprises to refer to poor microenterprises. The table below shows the difference between a nano and microenterprise.

 NanoenterpriseMicroenterprise
AssetsPhP3,000 to PhP150K>PhP150K to PhP3M
Employees01 to 9
Enterprise registrationMostly unregisteredMostly registered
Approximate number8,100,0001,000,000

The Social Reform Agenda or Republic Act 8425 of 1998 defined a microenterprise with a maximum capitalization of PhP150,000. The same amount is set as the maximum amount for microfinance loans. This figure could be used as a good basis to separate nanoenterprises from microenterprises.

SEDPI proposes that PhP150,000 be used as the maximum asset size for nanoenterprises while those that exceed this but is less than PhP3 million would be classified as microenterprise. Nanoenterprises use rudimentary and obsolete equipment in manufacturing products or delivering services or they may have more advanced equipment that they lease. Microenterprises typically have better equipment and have ownership of these.

Nanoenterprises are typically unregistered livelihoods of self-employed individuals or informal solo-preneurs. They operate businesses alone or with the help of unpaid family members targeting their immediate local communities. Microenterprises are mostly registered enterprises able to hire employees albeit on a minimum wage rate.

As of March 2022, SEDPI estimates that the total outreach of microfinance is 9.1 mllion based on reports from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Cooperative Development Authority and Securities and Exchange Commission.[1] One will observe the gross underestimation DTIs 1 million microenterprises versus the 9.1 million microenterprises the microfinance industry serves. This is mainly because DTIs estimate is based on registered microenterprises that are mostly non-poor. Removing the one million microenterprises accounted for by DTI, that leaves the number of nanoenterprises to be at 8.1 million. 

Why nanoenterprises?

The sheer number of nanoenterprises as distinguished from microenterprises should make them more visible to the government and private sector. Most government programs fall under the banner of microenterprises, that grossly misrepresents the needs and largely excludes the magnitude of nanoenterprises. Thus making a concrete case to add nanoenterprises as the smallest size in classifying enterprises. 

As it is, nanoenterprises lack support from the government and has limited engagement with the private sector This is because they are lumped into the microenterprise sector that clearly have different profile, behavior and needs. Making nanoeterprises visible means more effective and customized policies and programs that should provide them the opportunity to grow into a more sustainable enterprise that would lift them out of poverty.

There are 30 million Filipinos considered as poor based on a survey the Department of Social Welfare and Development conducted in 2022.[2] Directly addressing the needs of the 8.1 million estimated nanoenterprise will reduce this number by 27% which is a great leap forward for a truly inclusive Philippine economic development.


[1] https://vincerapisura.com/philippine-microfinance-industry-estimates/

[2] https://www.rappler.com/nation/filipino-families-living-in-poverty-2022-dswd/#:~:text=MANILA%2C%20Philippines%20%E2%80%93%20There%20are%20over,Welfare%20and%20Development%20(DSWD).

Philippine microfinance industry estimates

The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) defines microfinance as the provision of a broad range of financial services such as deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers and insurance products to the poor and low-income households, for their microenterprises and small businesses, to enable them to raise their income levels and improve their living standards.[1] It is also defined as the provision of financial services to low-income clients, including the self-employed.

Who is a microfinance client?

Typical microfinance clients are low-income persons that do not have access to formal financial institutions. Microfinance clients are typically self-employed, often household-based entrepreneurs. 

In rural areas, they are usually small farmers and fisher folk, as well as others who are engaged in small income-generating activities such as food processing and petty trade. In urban areas, microfinance activities are more diverse and include shopkeepers, service providers, artisans, street vendors, and others.[2]

Microfinance products

Financial products of microfinance used to be limited to savings and credit. Several financial services have sprung up in the past decade to address the other financial services needs of microfinance clients like insurance, remittance and even housing services.

Loans that are up to PhP150,000 used for consumption or productive purposes are classified as microfinance loans as stated in government’s Social Reform Agenda or Republic Act 8425 of 1997. The same amount is set as the maximum capitalization for microenterprises.

For microhousing loans, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) set the ceiling to PhP300,000 although the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) classifies socialized housing at PhP450,000.

Government policy

The National Strategy for Microfinance envisions a viable and sustainable microfinance market that will help provide poor households and microentrepreneurs with greater access to microfinance services.

It calls for a greater role for the private sector and the non-participation of government line agencies in the provision of credit and guarantee programs. Emphasis is on the adoption of market oriented financial and credit policies to ensure viability and sustainability.[3]

It is worthy to note that the Philippines closed the gender gap in terms of financial inclusion[4] which is largely attributed to microfinance institutions.

Players, portfolio and number of clients

There are approximately 6,183 microfinance institutions in the Philippines. 

Microfinance institutionNumber
Banks (2022)[5]139
Cooperatives (2020)[6]2,762
Microfinance NGOs (2022)[7]27
Financing companies (2017)[8]673
Lending companies (2017)[9]2,582
Total6,183

The microfinance industry in the Philippines has grown into a PhP406 billion industry in terms of loan portfolio as of March 2022. [10] This would be larger if the portfolio from financing and lending companies that also mostly qualify as microfinance loans are added. the figure also

Microfinance institutionAmount of portfolio in billion pesos
2022 1Q202120202019201820172016
Banks 26.8  27.7  26.6  27.2  22.6  17.1  13.7 
Cooperatives 327.1*  327.1*  327.1  315.8  315.8  194.1  167.4 
MF NGOs  52.8  52.8  50.4  41.9  30.9  28.6  20.6 
Total 406.7  407.6  404.1  384.9  369.3  239.8  201.7 

* Carried over from 2020 figures, due to lack of updated data from the Cooperative Development Authority, to come up with a reasonable estimate of the total outstanding loans of the industry.

There are 18.2 million recorded microfinance clients in the banking system, Microfinance NGO and cooperative sectors.[11] In SEDPI’s research with various microfinance institutions, it is common for a client to have multiple memberships. In fact, a typical microfinance client has average membership in two to three microfinance institutions.

To estimate the number of microfinance clients served, the total number is multiplied by a factor 0f 50% to account for multiple memberships. This would bring the estimated number of microfinance clients in the industry to 9.1 million as of the first quarter of 2022.

Microfinance institutionNumber of clients/members
2022 1Q202120202019201820172016
Banks 1,985,422  1,978,394  1,996,657  2,410,677  1,986,683  1,956,276  1,686,152 
Cooperatives 9,900,000*  9,900,000 * 9,900,000  9,800,000  9,500,000  9,400,000  8,000,000 
MF NGOs  6,400,000  6,200,000  6,400,000  6,200,000  5,200,000  4,300,000  3,900,000 
Total 18,285,422  18,078,394 18,296,657 18,410,677 16,686,683 15,656,276 13,586,152 
50% of total 9,142,711  9,039,197  9,148,329  9,205,339  8,343,342  7,828,138  6,793,076 

* Carried over from 2020 figures, due to lack of updated data from the Cooperative Development Authority, to come up with a reasonable estimate of the number of microfinance clients in the industry.

Based on the above figures, the average loan size per client in the industry is PhP22,000 as of the first quarter of 2022. Microfinance NGOs have the lowest average loan size at PhP8,250 which makes them reach the bottom of the pyramid. Cooperatives have the highest average loan size at PhP33,000 since most cater to salaried workers as well as farmers and microenterprises that require larger loan amounts. The average loan size for rural banks is PhP13,500.

Industry growth

Growth in microfinance portfolio was robust from 2017 to 2019, the pre-pandemic period, which registered 14% to 37% loan portfolio growth rate and 11%-16% member growth rate. Slight growth in loan portfolio was recorded in 2020 at 7% and remained flat in 2021 that registered only 1% loan portfolio growth.

Microfinance institutionGrowth in microfinance portfolio
20212020201920182017
Banks4%-2%20%32%25%
Cooperatives0%6%11%42%16%
MF NGOs 5%20%36%8%39%
Total1%7%14%37%19%

Number of clients had healthy growth rates from 2017 to 2019 which is ranged from 11% to 16%. On 2020 to 2021, the peak of the pandemic period, negative growth were recorded in terms of number of clients at -1% for each year. 

Microfinance institutionGrowth in number of clients
20212020201920182017
Banks-1%-17%21%2%16%
Cooperatives0%1%4%18%11%
MF NGOs -3%3%19%21%10%
Total-1%-1%11%16%11%

[1] BSP Circular No. 272, 30 January 2001

[2]Salonga, Edwin, “Microfinance: An Empowerment Tool for the Enterprising Poor,” October 8, 2003.

[3] Frequently Asked Questions on Microfinance, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas website

[4]https://public.tableau.com/views/MGIGendertableau/Dashboard1GPS?:embed=y&:showVizHome=no&:display_count=y&:display_static_image=y&:bootstrapWhenNotified=true

[5] bsp financial inclusion dashboard 220331

[6] bsp financial inclusion dashboard 220331

[7] list of sec accredited microfinance ngos 2022 221027

[8] list of financing companies with certificate of authority 171231

[9] list of lending companies with certificate of authority 171231

[10] Dashboard: Financial Inclusion in the Philippines, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, December 2020

[11] Based on BSP financial inclusion dashboard and SEDPI multiple membership estimates

The Role of the Private Sector in Supporting Populations Displaced by Disasters: The Case of the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation

This paper is written by SEDPI Chairperson, Mr. Edwin M. Salonga.

You may download the copy of the whole article here:

The Role of the Private Sector in Supporting Populations Displaced by Disasters: The Case of the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation

Edwin M. Salonga*[1]

Abstract

Considered an immediate impact of disasters, displacement is counterproductive to development as it affects human, economic, and environmental gains. With disaster displacement, private sector support becomes crucial at times when governments are overstretched. Businesses can be effective agents of change in building their own resilience and that of local communities. This paper takes a closer look at how the private sector plays a significant role in supporting populations displaced by disasters. It attempts to shed light on the experience of the Philippines by illustrating the case of the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation (PDRF), which brings together private sector companies towards the achievement of its overarching goal of building resilience among businesses and communities in the country. This paper traces PDRF’s initiatives from inception to date. Moreover, it outlines key factors that contribute to PDRF’s success in designing and implementing development efforts to support local communities affected by disasters. Among these are its emphasis on building the disaster resilience of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), maintaining its political neutrality, building institutional partnerships, investing in emergency preparedness measures, and promoting innovative practices.

Keywords

Private sector, Displaced populations, Disaster resilience, PDRF

  1. Introduction

Displacement is a common and immediate impact of disasters (NRC 2020). It is counterproductive to development as it affects human, economic, and environmental gains. It can create new risks and worsen the existing vulnerabilities of certain groups such as women, children and youth, older people, persons with disabilities, and indigenous communities (ADB 2020; NRC 2020). Disasters continue to have adverse impacts on the lives, property, and livelihoods of numerous people across the globe. 

At a time when governments are already overstretched, private sector support becomes crucial. Businesses can have a positive contribution towards disaster recovery and mitigation (GFDRR 2020). Public-private partnership initiatives are becoming more common. Many businesses may compete commercially with one another, but there is a growing realization among them that their collective and concerted efforts on all phases of disaster management can benefit not only their own companies but also the communities where they operate (IRP 2016). Businesses are increasingly being engaged in resilience building at the local, national, and global levels. They are seen to be agents of change in building their own resilience and that of local communities (UNDP 2017). Instead of working only on DRR efforts that promote their self-interest, the private sector is investing on resilience building initiatives that grow businesses and promote sustainable development (Abe et al. 2019). 

It is therefore important to take a closer look at how the private sector can play a significant role in supporting populations displaced by disasters. This paper attempts to shed light on the experience of the Philippines by illustrating the case of the Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation (PDRF), which brings together private sector companies towards the achievement of its overarching goal of building resilience among businesses and communities. It is able to coordinate and consolidate private sector efforts for effective complementation of resources. This paper outlines key factors that contribute to its success in designing and implementing development efforts to support local communities affected by disasters. Among these are its emphasis on building the disaster resilience of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), maintaining its political neutrality, building institutional partnerships, investing in emergency preparedness measures, and promoting innovative practices.

  1. Methodology and structure of the paper

This paper seeks to analyze the role that the private sector plays in supporting populations displaced by disasters. It reviews key literature on disaster displacement and the way businesses extend assistance to affected communities. The search for Journal publications was conducted in September 2021. Additional information from reports, project documents, policy papers, news articles, and institutional publications were gathered in October 2021. A key contribution of this paper is the collation and analysis of existing literature on the initiatives of PDRF as a case to exemplify how businesses can work together in providing assistance to communities affected by disasters. The results arising from the literature search were complemented by institutional knowledge from PDRF top management. 

This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the broad context on the importance of involving the private sector in humanitarian action and disaster risk reduction towards supporting populations displaced by disasters. Section 2 describes the methods employed in gathering information about disaster displacement, the role the private sector plays in supporting affected populations, and the development initiatives implemented in the Philippines by PDRF. Section 3 tackles the ways by which the private sector supports affected communities. Section 4 zooms in on the experience of the Philippines on disasters and displacement. Section 5 traces the initiatives of PDRF from its inception in 2009 until 2021. Section 6 discusses the unique features of PDRF as a model for generating private sector support for populations displaced by disasters. Lastly, Section 7 is about the conclusion that highlights key lessons that may be used to replicate PDRF’s model in other countries.

  1. Disasters, displacement, and private sector support to affected populations

Disasters often lead to the displacement of affected populations (NRC 2020). While some evacuees may be able to return relatively quickly after a hazard has abated, others may experience displacement for a protracted period to last for months or even years (Ponserre and Ginnetti 2019). Aside from disasters, conflicts and climate change further aggravate the situation of people at risk as each one intensifies the impact of the other (ISSAT 2020). Successful measures on disaster risk reduction limit how long people are displaced and help ensure displacement occurs in a dignified manner (NRC 2020).

The number of displaced people in recent years continues to rise. Data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre indicates around 40.5 million new displacements in 2020. This is the highest figure recorded in ten years, even with the Covid-19 pandemic that may have discouraged people from seeking emergency shelter outside their primary residence (IDMC 2021). It must be noted, however, that displacements may also be in the form of pre-emptive evacuations led by the government (IDMC 2020). As for the countries with the highest contributions to new internal displacements, China comes first with 5.1 million. The Philippines and Bangladesh come next with 4.4 million each (MDP 2021).

The private sector plays a significant role in reducing disaster losses and managing impacts to affected populations. Recent disaster management frameworks recognize this. The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 specifies that the private sector is among the actors concerned in protecting the social, economic, and environmental assets of communities and countries. It also highlights the importance of involving businesses on disaster prevention towards social and economic development (UNISDR 2005). Its successor, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, provides guidance on specific actions that the private sector can do to help achieve resilience and sustainable development. Its priorities for action highlight the need to bring in businesses for a holistic approach to disaster risk reduction (UNISDR 2015). The private sector is now regarded as a stakeholder in disaster risk reduction, especially as a partner of the government (Johnson and Abe 2015; Chandra et al. 2017; UNDP 2017; UNDRR 2019; GFDRR 2020).

While governments are viewed to be primarily responsible for preventing and responding to humanitarian needs, the private sector is seen to contribute a lot in reducing and managing disaster risks. Businesses provide financial and non-financial resources to help alleviate the impacts of disasters on affected communities (Connecting Business initiative 2019). In addition, the private sector is seen to make humanitarian responses quicker and more effective, especially those businesses with local presence that act as first responders (Fenton and Foley 2015). Some even expanded their roles from being donors and service providers to being commercial actors as they respond to humanitarian crises. Businesses are seen to facilitate growth and productivity for displaced people and their host communities (Boyer and Dupont 2016). Aside from generating jobs and livelihoods, private sector interventions in internal displacement situations may also be through the provision of goods and services, finance, and affordable housing (World Bank 2021). More importantly, the private sector is also seen to play an important role in disaster preparedness and coordination (ECHO 2017). A “whole-of-society” approach is recommended to ensure the participation of the displaced populations as well as the private sector towards the identification and achievement of lasting solutions (GP20 2020). 

  1. Disasters and displacement in the Philippines

Located in the Pacific Ring of Fire, the Philippines is one of the most seismic countries in the world. It is also located in East Asia’s typhoon belt. Its unique topography exposes it to earthquakes, volcanic activity, tropical cyclones, storms, and floods that displace millions of people each year. In 2020, about 4.4. million new disaster displacements were recorded in the Philippines. This figure is the second highest in the world, only behind China. It must be noted that the Philippines is considered a rare example of a country where it is possible to obtain information about the way displacement evolves over time (Ponserre and Ginnetti 2019). Aside from disasters, conflict and instability in the southern part of the country also contribute to protracted displacement of people spanning decades (IDMC [no date]).

The Philippines consistently ranks among the countries in the world with the highest disaster risk in recent years, according to the World Risk Reports. In 2018, it was ranked third with a risk index value of 26.70. Out of 172 countries, the Philippines was only behind Vanuatu and Tonga (Heintze et al. 2018). It was ranked ninth in 2019 (Day et al. 2019). In 2020, it was again ranked ninth in the world with the highest disaster risk. Moreover, data shows that the Philippines was among the countries heavily affected by disasters that led to new significant internal displacement in the years of 2015 to 2019 (Behlert et al. 2020). With a risk index value of 21.39, it was ranked eighth in 2021 (Aleksandrova et al. 2021).

  1. PDRF initiatives

PDRF was formed in the wake of Tropical Storm Ondoy (Ketsana) in 2009, answering the call for private sector support in the provision of relief and response assistance to affected communities. It started with a five-pillar program consisting of development interventions in shelter; livelihood; education; environment; and water, infrastructure, sanitation and  health. Its model allowed corporations to participate in ways they are comfortable with. Aside from pooling their material and financial resources together, businesses also shared their expertise (Lucas 2014). It paved an avenue for businesses to be involved even in the implementation of early recovery measures. 

In 2013, Super Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) displaced approximately 4.1 million people and destroyed 1.1 million houses. PDRF initially deployed 50 “butterfly houses” made from eco-boards, consisting of 100 percent recycled materials. It also provided 150 indigenous housing facilities in various resettlement areas in Leyte (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2014). PDRF intensified its efforts to address the need for quality shelter and transitional housing facilities. In partnership with the local government and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), it provided an additional 100 “butterfly houses” as transitional dwellings for affected communities in Tacloban (Desacada 2017). 

The crisis in Marawi, a city located on the southern island of Mindanao in the Philippines, happened in March 2017. It displaced thousands of local families(UNHCR Philippines 2021). Arising from a study on the Marawi City water supply system, PDRF immediately committed to the construction of 12 water tanks, in an effort to augment the water needs of those staying in transitional shelters and evacuation camps (OCHA Philippines 2018b). In collaboration with other organizations, it worked on addressing the medical, water and sanitation, livelihoods, and education needs of the affected populations. In 2018, while PDRF supported the recovery efforts in Marawi, it also responded to the Mayon volcanic eruption in January, the Super Typhoon Ompong (Mangkhut) in September, and the Typhoon Rosita (Yutu) in October (OCHA and UNDP 2020). 

In total, PDRF and its partner companies were able to install 17 water tanks in underserved transitional shelter sites in 2018. These tanks provided more than 200,000 liters of clean water per day for affected communities (PDRF 2020). In addition, 10 underserved schools were given a 3,200-liter water tank each. Also part of the project was the community training on water management and hygiene to instill the value of water and how to use it sustainably (Daily Tribune2019). In addition, the project included the distribution of hygiene kits and the conduct of activities promoting proper hygiene (PDRF 2020). Understanding that jobs and livelihoods are important to wellbeing, PDRF supported the design and implementation of job fairs in Marawi. Among those that participated were local enterprises with an interest in supporting economic empowerment of the affected populations (Connecting Business initiative 2019). It must be noted, however, that while the displaced populations are still struggling to return to normalcy, the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbates their situation (UNHCR Philippines 2021).

The Covid-19 pandemic heightened the needs and vulnerabilities of internally displaced persons. Moreover, it impeded humanitarian efforts, delaying the delivery of lasting solutions (IDMC 2021). In cases like this, it is evident that local actors play a crucial role in ensuring that adequate assistance is given to those who need it the most. In the Philippines, the private sector actively mobilizes resources to support affected communities and augment the services provided by the government. 

When the Taal Volcano started to erupt in January 2020, PDRF sprang into action and immediately started its relief operation in Batangas. It provided face masks, sleeping kits, and bottled water to displaced families in five evacuation centers (PDRF 2021a). Response efforts lasted for months, well beyond the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020. Despite the additional challenge brought about by restrictions in mobility, PDRF delivered essential food and non-food items to Batangas (NDRRM Operations Center 2021). It extended much-needed aid to the communities hardest-hit by the Taal volcano eruption in nine evacuation centers in Batangas. PDRF also deployed staff to repack and distribute hygiene kits, face masks, and other donated relief items to the affected communities (PDRF 2021b). Moreover, it began the construction of a multi-purpose facility in Batangas for people burdened by disasters and pandemics. It was designed to serve as a safe haven for those severely affected by the Taal Volcano and to help them prepare for future disasters. Aside from being an accessible and disaster-resilient structure that can protect the nearby population from the threat of existing hazards, the center may also be used for community programs and activities (The Manila Times 2021).

With the Covid-19 pandemic in the background, PDRF adjusted its operations to ensure continuous delivery of its services while following safety measures set by the government. It distributed food and non-food relief items to vulnerable sectors and provided millions of personal protective equipment and medical supplies to hospitals (PDRF 2021a). By mid-2020, PDRF was able to coordinate and implement various response efforts of its member companies. It raised close to 1.8 billion pesos worth of cash and in-kind donations through Project Ugnayan (National Task Force on COVID-19 2020). Project Ugnayan was a multi-sectoral, collaborative effort of the private sector, which aimed to provide unconditional emergency cash transfers to help economically-vulnerable families and address the food security needs of those affected by the enhanced community quarantine (PDRF 2021a). Through Project Ugnayan, PDRF was able to reach over 7.6 million people in vulnerable communities of the Greater Metro Manila Area (PLDT 2020). By the end of the year, PDRF was able to raise donations valued at 3 billion pesos (Presidential Management Staff 2020). 

Since its establishment, PDRF continues to mobilize, inform, and direct business involvement and contributions for disaster management. It engages the country’s largest businesses and MSMEs (CSR Asia 2015). To date, PDRF remains to be the country’s major private sector vehicle for disaster risk management.

  1. PDRF as a model for private sector support to displaced populations

The private sector plays a key role in supporting populations displaced by disasters. Using the PDRF as a model, there are a number of factors identified to contribute in its successful design and implementation of development initiatives. Among these are its emphasis on building the disaster resilience of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), maintaining political neutrality, building institutional partnerships, investing in emergency preparedness, and promoting innovation.

  • Strengthening disaster resilience

PDRF seeks to strengthen the disaster resilience of communities and businesses in the Philippines. With this as its overarching goal, PDRF is able to convene private sector companies to build their own disaster risk management capabilities and to contribute to the sustainable development of the Filipino people (PDRF [no date]). It is able to coordinate and consolidate private sector efforts for effective complementation of resources, especially as a means to augment the services provided by the government. It understands that disasters not only threaten the life of local populations, but also their livelihoods. For this reason, PDRF provides support to micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).

Nowadays, working with larger and more established companies is considered one of the most promising ways to upgrade small and medium enterprises in fragile and development contexts (Boyer and Dupont 2016). While most of its members are big companies, PDRF believes in the strength of the supply chain, with large companies linked with MSMEs. In just a few years, PDRF reached around 7,000 MSME owners throughout the Philippines with business continuity training (OCHA and UNDP 2019; UNDRR 2019). PDRF also offers technical support towards MSME resilience as it provides capacity-building interventions in an effort to build local competitiveness and sustainability (Philippines Humanitarian Country Team 2020). PDRF, with its UN partners, also developed SIKAP – or Synergizing Recovery Initiatives, Knowledge, and Adaptation Practices for MSMEs— a unified online business recovery hub to help enterprises affected by the pandemic (OCHA and UNDP 2020). Since 2017, PDRF has been supporting internally displaced populations in Marawi, extending capacity building sessions on financing and business recovery for MSMEs (OCHA and UNDP 2021).

Moreover, as part of the National MSME Resilience Core Group, PDRF is able to further strengthen its advocacy for MSMEs. Established in 2016, the National MSME Resilience Core Group (MSME-RCG) is a public-private partnership geared towards promoting the disaster and business resilience of enterprises in the country (DTI [no date]). Through the project “Strengthening MSME Disaster Resilience in the Philippines” the MSME-RCG was able to adopt a “National Roadmap and Action Plan on Strengthening Disaster Resilience” from a framework of the iPrepare Business facility of the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC). The Philippine national roadmap and action plan has four (4) roadmap themes: Enhancing MSME general and disaster risk data; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) and Business Continuity (BC) awareness and training; Tailored risk financing for MSMEs; and MSME inclusion in DRRM and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) policy, planning, and local institutions. The thematic areas aim to provide strategic direction on MSME program enablers’ plans and programs (Casado-Asensio et al. 2021). In 2019, the MSME RCG launched the MSME Guide to Disaster Resilience to serve as a reference material for MSMEs in understanding the basic concepts of disaster risk reduction and management, and business continuity practices (Mina 2019).

  • Maintaining political neutrality

Among the key attributes regarded to ensure its long-term sustainability is its political neutrality. PDRF was able to sustain funding from a diverse range of sources, with the majority coming from the private sector (CSR Asia 2015). Because of this, companies can aid affected communities across political lines (How the Philippines brought business into disaster recovery – GovInsider. 2017). PDRF deploys the assets of its member companies to support the needs of the communities. 

PDRF works to augment the capacities of the government (DSWD 2018). It believes that disaster management is not a responsibility of the government alone (PLDT 2020). Hence, it coordinates with the government to provide support by providing necessary resources such as fuel, machinery, and manpower (JICA 2017). Known to be self-reliant in terms of resource mobilization, through PDRF and other actors the private sector is integrated in the coordination, design, and actual implementation of humanitarian action in the country (Philippines Humanitarian Country Team 2020).

  • Building institutional partnerships

PDRF recognizes that institutional partnerships are important in sustaining its efforts to help communities affected by disasters. In 2018, PDRF signed a memorandum of agreement (MOU) with the  Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to extend help to disadvantaged populations (DSWD 2018). Under the MOU, PDRF commits to provide capacity augmentation on disaster operations, public service continuity, and interventions along disaster resiliency. The MOU seeks to strengthen public-private partnerships towards inclusive development in the country (de Vera-Ruiz 2018). 

Together with the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), PDRF developed the Public Service Continuity Planning (PSCP) guidebook, which is a step-by-step guide that focuses on the development of an agency-specific public service continuity plan. It seeks to ensure that any agency is able to withstand disruptive events and continue to operate and sustain the delivery of public service (Tebrio 2020). The PSCP Guidebook was initiated as part of the PSCP Program, which was co-developed through the partnership of OCD and PDRF in 2017. This was formally institutionalized through the NDRRMC Memorandum No. 33, s. 2018 which enjoined government agencies, both on the national and local levels, to develop and implement their own public service continuity plans (Florano 2020). PDRF, through the creation of the PSCP Program aims to contribute to the strengthening of the country’s overall resilience, consistent with its advocacy that both public and private sectors are the key actors in ensuring continuity of operations and critical services.

  • Investing in emergency preparedness

The Philippines is considered among the only few countries wherein time series displacement data may be obtained. The analysis of such data reveals the impacts of disaster preparedness and response measures (Ponserre and Ginnetti 2019). Aside from its disaster response and recovery efforts, PDRF also focuses on disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness (CSR Asia 2015; OCHA Philippines 2018a). This is rooted in the belief among the business leaders behind PDRF that large-scale calamities are now the norm in the Philippines, being a disaster-prone country (Lucas 2014). 

PDRF plays a lead role in business continuity awareness and capacity-building (UNDRR 2019). PDRF also has its own e-learning platform on disaster risk reduction, business continuity, and climate change adaptation that it calls Innovations Academy for Disaster Awareness, Preparedness, and Training (iADAPT). It aims to prepare communities against disasters (Aguinaldo 2020). Moreover, PDRF also believes that the private sector has a role to play in fighting the effects of climate change and helping reverse it (Quismorio 2021).

  • Promoting innovation

The private sector can promote innovation by sharing lessons and good practices, especially on how to support displaced populations (Connecting Business initiative 2019). Businesses may likewise provide innovative products and services (ISSAT 2020). Considered among its innovative practices is the establishment of PDRF’s emergency operations center (EOC). It believes that there must be an efficient way of providing relief goods and responding to the needs of the populations affected by disasters. Effective coordination means partnering not just among businesses but also with governments and development-oriented organizations (Trajano 2016). Its EOC has an operations room that combines location software, data sources, and weather information. It is regarded as the world’s first national EOC run by the private sector. Its central feature is the command center that monitors earthquakes, tropical cyclones, volcanic eruptions, and pandemics (PLDT 2018). 

PDRF’s EOC acts as a self-sufficient operations hub for training on disaster preparedness and the coordination of relief and response efforts during major disasters (OCHA and UNDP 2019). It has 24/7 capability and continues to monitor hazards and coordinate help to the areas and populations affected by disasters. Radios and satellite equipment are prepositioned to ensure that it will continue to operate even during worst case scenarios. For the EOC’s disaster information management system, its main tool is the Hazard and Disaster Analysis for Business Resilience or HANDA, which is also a local term that means ready. Among the features of HANDA are the following: real-time hazard monitoring for tropical cyclones and earthquakes; access to historical and probabilistic data for risk assessment; and highly customizable dashboards for data visualization. These features provide the necessary data and tools for the stakeholders in PDRF’s network to make informed decisions (Philippine private sector provides logistics support for Typhoon Ompong relief operations – Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation. 2018).

The EOC may be used to support local and national governments as well as local and international development organizations (Philippines Humanitarian Country Team 2020). Moreover, it provides alerts and updates to PDRF member companies to coordinate asset inventory and the status of lifeline services. These greatly complement government efforts and highlight private sector initiatives in all aspects of disaster risk reduction and management (PLDT 2020). It maps data on lifeline services and public infrastructure to help protect them from hazards (PLDT 2018). Since the EOC lets its member companies coordinate with other donors, among the initiatives it can do is to direct the electricity suppliers to provide emergency power to people most in need (How the Philippines brought business into disaster recovery – GovInsider. 2017).

  1. Conclusion

The private sector plays a key role in supporting populations displaced by disasters. Using PDRF as the case to examine the ways by which businesses can extend assistance to affected populations, this paper provides an analysis of key factors that contributed to the success of its development initiatives. The private sector needs to be involved in all aspects of disaster risk management. Businesses can contribute not only in relief, response, and early recovery measures once disasters strike. More importantly, they can be involved in disaster risk reduction and preparedness efforts. 

There are plenty of ways for the private sector to support populations displaced by disasters. To be effective, there are lessons that may be learned from PDRF’s experience. First, it was important to anchor its advocacy on an overarching goal of strengthening the resilience of business and communities against disasters. This served as the unifying call for private sector companies to come together and help out one another as well as those adversely affected by disasters, including MSMEs. Second, it was crucial for PDRF to maintain its political neutrality. Aside from independence in designing and implementing its development initiatives, political neutrality also allowed PDRF to extend support to localities most in need. Third, institutional partnerships were instrumental in sustaining its efforts. Despite personnel changes among its partners, PDRF was able to move forward with its programs. Fourth, investments were made towards emergency preparedness. PDRF offered capacity building interventions to its member companies and to local communities to prepare them against disasters. Fifth, PDRF promoted innovation with its establishment of an EOC. Aside from providing alerts and updates to its member companies, the EOC also supported other organizations in an effort to mitigate risks and to provide support where it was needed.

Given the limited scope of this paper that focuses only on the Philippine experience in the examination of the role of the private sector in supporting populations displaced by disasters, it is recommended for further studies to be undertaken. Nevertheless, PDRF may be used as a model to initiate or improve the ways businesses are engaged in providing assistance to populations affected by disasters. 

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[1] Edwin M. Salonga

   Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC)

   edwin.salonga@adpc.net

   +639989923210